HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SOVIET TERRORISM

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

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FIRST SESSION

ON

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HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SOVIET TERRORISM

THURSDAY, JUNE 11, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff present: Joel S. Lisker, chief counsel and staff director; Bert W. Milleng, Jr., counsel; and Fran Wermuth, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. Good morning. This hearing will come to order.

Today's hearing will deal with the subject of the antecedents of Soviet terrorism. The other members of the subcommittee may or may not be able to find time in their schedules to appear. Senator East has been chairing a subcommittee hearing for some weeks and is very busily engaged in preparations and reviews of those hearings. Senator Leahy, who has often appeared here, may come again this morning. He has three hearings scheduled this morning, however, Senator Hatch has two I know of, one of which I am supposed to be at in 15 minutes. I will be unable to appear with him. Senator Biden, who has come frequently, is to be congratulated as the new father of a baby girl, and he may not be here due to taking care of his wife and new baby.

I would like to welcome our witness for today, Dr. James Billington, and would ask him if he would come forward. We would like to acknowlege the presence of his two sons, Tom and Jim.

Dr. Billington, which is Tom and which is Jim?

Mr. BILLINGTON. This is Tom and Jim is hiding back there.

Senator DENTON. Welcome, gentlemen.

This subcommittee has held two hearings aside from oversight hearings on the FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The first of the nonoversight hearings dealt with the origins, directions, and support for international terrorism. At that hearing there was agreement among the witnesses that the Soviet Union is clearly responsible for supporting and encouraging terrorist activities throughout the world as part of a larger program of active policies.

It is evident that there exists an identifiable network of interconnections between terrorism and those parties and entitites committed to the ideologies of Marx and Lenin. In point of fact, when we come to the realization that terrorism is possessed of a logic and is

not the work of madmen working in isolation, the complexity which appears to surround terrorism soon disappears.

Much of the Soviet role in international terrorism has been poorly comprehended in this country and elsewhere because of considerable confusion which is encouraged by some so-called experts regarding the nature of communism.

That argument goes this way: The founding fathers of Soviet communism strongly opposed the spontaneous terrorism of the Russian populists and anarchists. It is presumed, therefore, that the Soviets are by heritage an ideology ill disposed toward today's political terrorism.

Based upon this presumption, the argument develops that the Soviets are often reluctantly or even unwittingly drawn into involvement with terrorists. It is frequently stated by those same misguided advocates for this thesis that the Soviets would probably prevent terrorist acts if they could but gain stronger control over the irresponsible organizations which perpetrate it.

It then follows for some that we should not only seek Soviet assistance in limiting terrorists, but the expansion of Soviet influence in politically unstable countries will help end terrorism.

As the record of the last hearing so clearly states, we know the Soviets have directly trained and supplied elements around the world and what the Soviets euphemistically refer to as wars of national liberation they have employed proxies of Cubans, East Germans, Czechs, and others to extend this direct effort aimed not only at the "imperialism" of America and our allies but at a variety of less despotic states than their own, from Mexico to Uruguay to North Yemen to Morocco to Puerto Rico.

They have provided training and logistics to a number of groups who use this assistance in their own terrorist attacks. They have supported a heterogeneous group of terrormongers from Libya's Qadhafi to Palestinian kidnapers of Arab oil leaders to Cuban trainees in Africa to Bulgarian assassins.

Anyone who is aware of the realities I have just desicribed and continues to hold the Soviets blameless is either intellectually dishonest, inattentive, or may possibly have other more sinister motives. Even when put in their most favorable light, such arguments suggest a serious misreading and lack of appreciation for Communist history and doctrine.

Lenin and Trotsky both supported political terrorism. A basic tenet of Leninism is that socialism can be achieved only through revolution; thus, a terrorist force is a necessary element of a party's structure.

During the Russian insurrection of 1905 Lenin in a letter to the combat committee of the St. Petersburg Bolsheviks stated,

> Let 5 or 10 people make the round of hundreds of workers and student study circles in a week, penetrate wherever they can, and everywhere propose a clear, brief, direct, and simple plan. Organize combat groups immediately, arm yourselves as best you can and work with all of your might. We will help you in every way we can, but do not wait for our help. Act for yourselves.

Continuing his quotation,

> The propagandists must supply each group with brief and simple recipes for making bombs. Give them an elementary explanation of the type of work, and then leave it all to them. Squads must at once begin military training by launching operations immediately at once. Some may at once undertake to kill a spy or blow

up a police station, others to raid a bank to confiscate funds for the insurrection. Others again may drill or prepare plans to localities and so forth.

But the essential thing is to begin at once to learn from actual practice. Have no fear of these trial attacks. They may, of course, degenerate into extremes, but that is the evil of the morrow, whereas the evil of today is in our inertness, our doctrinaire spirit, our learned immobility, and our senile fear of initiative.

Let every group learn, if it is only by beating up policemen. A score or so of victims will be more than compensated for by the fact that this will train hundreds of experienced fighters for tomorrow, who will be leading hundreds of thousands.

The revolutionary who hopes to seize power through violence will find ample justification in texts of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and other prominent Communist authors. Lenin clearly stated that Communists must master the techniques of struggle and conflict and during the first revolution against czarism more than 1,000 terrorist acts were perpetrated in Transcaucasia, as Trotsky once asserted.

In the "Communist Manifesto" Marx and Engels specifically recommended armed uprising as a means for forcibly demolishing the established order. General strikes, boycotts, mass demonstrations, and other tactics which become familiar during the past century are entirely compatible with the Marxist prescription.

If Marx and Engels did not recommend the armed uprising at every point and at every time, it was because they were anxious to avoid premature, ill-prepared, or inopportune revolutionary actions. Lenin shared their anxiety about actions which would imperil the success of the revolution. He wrote, "Fear, like the plague, the unruly guerrilla spirit, the arbitrary actions of isolated attachments, and disobedience to the central authority for it spells doom." He was not condemning guerrilla warfare but only warning against its being waged without central party control.

It is statements like that by Lenin which give rise to the thesis which I mentioned at the beginning of this opening statement. In order to obtain a better understanding of the historical underpinnings for current Soviet involvement in terrorism, the subcommittee has invited two eminent scholars to testify.

Today our witness is Dr. James Billington, Director of the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars. Dr. Billington holds a B.A. degree from Princeton. He received his doctor of philosophy from Oxford where he was a Rhodes scholar at Balliol College. He served in the U.S. Army 1953 to 1956 and began his teaching career as a history instructor at Harvard in 1957.

He subsequently served at Harvard as assistant professor of history and research fellow at the Russian Research Center. In 1962 he went to Princeton and was appointed professor of history in 1964. Dr. Billington has been a Guggenheim fellow, a McCosh faculty fellow of Princeton University; guest lecturer at the University of Leningrad, the University of Puerto Rico, and leading universities in Western Europe, as well as guest research professor at the Institute of History in Moscow, the University of Helsinki, and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. Pardon my French.

A Phi Beta Kappa, he is a director of the Association of American Oxonians, a past director of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations and of P.E.N. He is on the advisory board of Foreign Affairs and Theology Today.

He is the author of "Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism," "The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture," published in 1966, and "Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith," published last year. He has written widely in Life, Foreign Affairs, and other professional and popular journals.

Since 1973 he has been Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. This is the congressionally created official national memorial to Woodrow Wilson, which is located in the original red "Castle" building of the Smithsonian Institution and is an international institute for advanced study dedicated to producing advanced scholarship and interacting "the world of learning and the world of public affairs."

Under his directorship a major set of regionally focused international programs has been established at the Wilson Center, beginning with the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in 1974 and the Latin American program in 1976. The program of meetings has expanded to about 250 a year. And the Wilson Quarterly, which he founded at the Center in 1976, has now more than 100,000 paid subscribers.

He visited Yugoslavia, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. in October 1976 to conduct program review prior to the negotiation of new bilateral cultural agreements. On his visit to Japan as distinguished guest scholar of the Japan Foundation, he met on cultural matters with the Prime Minister of Japan and other officials in November 1976. He accompanied the official delegation of the U.S. House of Representatives to the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. in April 1979.

We could hardly find a more qualified witness, and we are extremely privileged to have his presence here this morning.

A hearty welcome to you, Dr. Billington.

STATEMENT OF JAMES H. BILLINGTON, DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

Mr. BILLINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Would you care to make an opening statement, sir?

Mr. BILLINGTON. Yes, thank you.

Violence, assassination, and systematic political coercion are as old as history. But terrorism is new: The disciplined and organized use of illegal violence to induce terror and produce political change. Both this phenomenon and the word used to describe it are distinct products of the modern revolutionary tradition, which has arisen and spread only in the last 200 years.

Let me attempt briefly to outline the early history of both this revolutionary tradition and of its terrorist component—treating only the period of the formation to the 1980's.

I do so with the hope that something useful can be learned from the historian's preoccupation with origins, but also with the apprehension which I profoundly hope you share and understand—that any historical narrative is subject to correction, that my interpretations are necessarily controversial, that there may be as many risks as benefits in trying to extract lessons from the past, and that the extremely short notice given me for this testimony as well as my full-time administrative duties at the Wilson Center have pre-

vented me from reading, let alone drawing on, most of the recent literature, data, and controversy about this subject in its contemporary context.

The modern belief in revolution can be described as kind of a political substitute for religious faith in the modern world, in my view. Like any faith, that of the revolutionary rests on an inherent implausibility: that a massive act of violence will end all violence. And it also rests on a belief in the miraculous: that the forcible overthrow of traditional authority will produce a transformation that is total, yet totally secular, totally in and of this world.

This belief is essentially the creation of politicized European intellectuals in the late 18th and 19th centuries who believed they could transpose into the social sphere the impulse toward radical simplification and the promise of total rational control that seems to have been introduced into the human condition, at least with regard to the natural order, by the rise of modern science through Newton.

Basic divisions in this modern revolutionary faith can, I believe, Mr. Chairman—and I will submit to you a sort of tabular chart which in its oversimplified form illustrates this—be described in terms of the basic slogan of the French Revolution: "Liberty, fraternity, and equality." This, Mr. Chairman, like other points of history I am about to make, are in a much more extended view dealt with in my book. So I can only outline a very brief schematic background here.

But our own American Revolution was the classic first case, the case of a constitutional revolution for liberty, part of a series of upheavals against tyranny in the highly entrepreneural, predominantly Protestant, North Atlantic world—beginning in 16th-century Holland through 17th-century England on to 18th-century America.

Leaders of these revolutions had limited political objectives, did not generally describe themselves as "revolutionaries," and almost always used the term "revolution" only in its older sense of "revolution," the revolving back to a temporary violated order of rights and liberties that had historic roots, it was believed, in the polity involved.

Leaders of these original revolutions, these revolutions of the first type in the North Atlantic world, unlike the leaders of most later European upheavals with only a few 19th-century exceptions like Belgium and Switzerland, leaders of these original revolutions in the North Atlantic world did not reject the concept of a creator and a created universe and sought to diffuse rather than concentrate power once they attained it.

The American rebels were practical people, seeking to preserve liberty and willing to live with complexity rather than accept the radical simplicity of any new ideology. The American Revolution, once it moved away from seeking independence to forming a constitution, created therefore an extremely complex system of checks and balances and a decentralized multilayered federal system.

Now, the French Revolution began in 1789 as a political revolution for liberty, along the same general lines. Nevertheless as it progressed, as the revolutionary process of the 1790's dragged on, it brought into being two altogether new types of revolutionary faith:

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the revolution for fraternity and the revolution for equality. The revolution for fraternity or brotherhood was a romantic revolt, not just against tyranny but against human isolation. Its characteristic document, if you like, was not a declaration of independence but the "Marseillaise." Its god was the nation. Its aim was the emotional neotribal unification of a people, not the rational reconstitution of governance. The new word invented in the late 1790's to describe this type of revolutionary cause was "nationalism," and it became the dominant faith of, the revolutionary movement in Catholic, largely southern Europe, ranging from Latin America to Poland, until the final defeat of the Paris Commune and discrediting of French leadership of the world revolutionary movement in 1871.

The second new ideal of national revolution has remained in many ways the dominant type in the modern world. But it was soon rivaled by the third and still more radical vision of a revolution for equality: the rationalistic, utopian ideal of some vast egalitarian community that would obliterate all national borders and social distinctions.

The word "communism," like "nationalism," was an invention of the late 1790's. Beginning with this revolutionary period in France, revolution for equality represented a universal revolution against social hierarchy, just as the revolution for fraternity represented an emotional revolution against foreign domination.

Now, each of these new revolutionary ideals were, unlike the earlier ideal of liberty, basically authoritarian and theoretically totalistic in the claims they made on their followers. Each of these new ideals contained a fundamental contradiction between a shining end and the blighted means used to attain it. The national revolutionary ideal fanned violence without in order to develop brotherhood within. The social revolutionaries built secret hierarchies among themselves in order to eliminate all hierarchies among everyone else.

The struggle between national and social revolutionaries has been the great internal civil war of the modern revolutionary faith. Nationalism, which has ancient roots and invisible emotional appeal, has generally proved the more resilient and powerful cause. But revolutionary socialism found a deep resonance and, ultimately, a path to power within the hierarchical society of Eastern Europe as industrial unrest spread in Europe and as the urban center of revolutionary gravity moved from Paris to St. Petersburg after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War and the crushing of the Paris Commune in its wake.

Terrorism, like communism, first arose within this third branch of the revolutionary tradition, the revolution for social equality. Terrorism was one of the first distinctive forms which the social revolutionary faith assumed as it first took root in Russia in the 1860's and 1870's. The word "terrorism" was first adopted, as far as I know, as a self-conscious badge of pride by a significant revolutionary group in Russia at the end of the 1870's, just before they launched the most spectacular program of systematic political assassination in the 19th century which culminated in the murder of Czar Alexander II in 1881, almost exactly 100 years ago.

The proper history of terrorism begins, however, earlier—and in Paris—precisely at that great historic dividing line which separates

the predominance of the original American-type limited revolutions for liberty and the earlier stages of the French Revolution from the new more authoritarian types of neopagan revolutionary faith in blood brotherhood or universal equality that arose from the revolutionary turmoil in France.

That historic divide came at the time when revolutionary France first went to war with the established powers in Europe in 1792 and then plunged into its famous "reign of terror" under Robespierre's dictatorship. Haunted by their own lack of either physical security or spiritual legitimacy, the Jacobin leadership under Robespierre totally broke with the precedent of the earlier North Atlantic revolutions for liberty which the French Revolution had largely followed up to that time, systematically using the applied science of Dr. Guillotin, his guillotine, to terrorize the entire populace, destroying federalist impulses which had hitherto been very strong, concentrating power in a dictatorship, seeking no longer to reform the church but to supplant religion altogether and indeed to date time itself henceforth from the installation of their regime rather than the birth of Christ.

The word "terrorist" was not generally used during this period—not even within the first attempt to mount systematically a revolution for social equality, Babeuf's conspiracy of equals, which extended into the social sphere the totalistic ideas and hierarchical discipline of the Jacobin tradition.

But the term "terrorist" was fairly extensively used by Napoleon, who rose to power through service under Robespierre's brother and once in power was traumatized by two violent attempts on his life late in 1800. One came from the Jacobin left, another from the Royalist right. But Napoleon applied the word "terrorist" predominantly to the left, seeing in its commitment to political violence through secret organization a reason, or a pretext, if you prefer, for moving toward dictatorial power and, indeed, adopting many of the techniques and many of the personnel left over from the earlier reign of terror.

Napoleon returned to the term again in his last days on St. Helena, describing Filippo Buonarroti, the flamboyant descendant of Michelangelo, who was the principal perpetuator in the early 19th century of Babeuf's tradition of advocating secret hierarchical organization to produce a universal egalitarian revolution. As if foreseeing the extraordinary moral purity and dedication that the Russian revolutionary tradition would later produce in its earlier stage, its heroic stage, Napoleon characterized Buonarroti as "a man of good faith, pure, a terrorist."

In other words, he equated terrorism not with petty criminality but with the disciplined, dedicated use of political violence to produce a selfless revolution on behalf of others.

During the early 19th century when the national revolutionary tradition predominated, most political acts in Europe—and there were many of them—were expressive emotional attempts of direct action against alleged tyrants, usually with some foreign connection.

The attempt was made to awaken the sleeping masses with an inspiring example to inspire them against a foreign oppressor by heroic but essentially isolated acts, many of them taking place

around theaters or opera houses with some sort of romantic connection with actual performances.

Terror was admired particularly among the followers of Auguste Blanque as a means of simplifying strategy and unifying a movement. Although the Marxists consistently condemned Blanquism, they nevertheless admired the example of Blanqui and even on occasion endorsed the brief tactical acceptance of terrorism as a response.

For instance, after the disappointments of the revolutionary year of 1848, Marx saw it as a response to the cannibalism of the counterrevolution and the only means to shorten, to simplify, to concentrate the murderous death throes of the old society and the bloody birth pangs of the new.

But this was only a brief infatuation during a revolutionary crisis. It was in Russia and among non-Marxists that the new, more ascetic, impersonal, and strategic concept of calculated revolutionary violence first appeared and decisively supplanted the old ideal of romantic semisuicidal direct action.

The Russian revolutionaries of the 1860's and 1870's replaced the assassin's traditional dagger or pistol with the bomb, the ritual assembly of which was undertaken in an almost sacramental manner in their conspiratorial gatherings. The revolutionary organization which eventually assassinated Alexander II publicly announced its name as "The People's Will" only after its first bomb had exploded in public. This was the ultimate in revolutionary simplification: the reduction not just of reality to ideology and of ideology to slogans, but of a slogan to a shout to an inhuman explosion. But it was an act not of emotional gratification, as the earlier political violence had tended to be, but rather of a rational strategy.

The People's Will organization sought systematically to remove through a carefully planned succession of acts enough key authorities to force whoever remained either severely to modify the czarist political system or perhaps to relinquish control altogether.

It is interesting to note that the word "terrorist" was apparently first introduced in Russia during the intensive discussions about revolutionary strategy among young intellectuals in Kiev in the late 1870's. They were trying to find a new alternative to the sterile strategies which were then being considered of either an insurrection based on the peasantry on the one hand or a gradualist reliance on peaceful propaganda and worker organization on the other.

Some new unifying alternative was needed, and it was called urban terrorism. It was advanced by a small group who adopted the name of "terrorist" as a badge of pride. Terrorism became the dominant strategy then of the People's Will organization, who mounted a national political campaign of struggle from within against czarism.

If may be worth noting five characteristics of these first self-proclaimed terrorists, during the decade from their first adoption of the label in 1877 to the liquidation of the last significant cell—and the execution of Lenin's older brother, who was one of its recruits in 1887, exactly a decade later.

First: Terrorism was essentially a product of the aroused expectations of a suddenly enlarged educated class which had been rooted in, but was torn away, from traditional religious values. Time and time again they were referred to as seminarians in reference to their village education from which many of them came to the urban universities. Editorial staffs and groups were often called consistories, and the spectacular trials were represented as reenactments of Christ before Pilate with the defendant stand popularly referred to as Golgotha.

Just as we have seen in recent years, the educated daughter of a Lutheran pastor become a leader of the Bader-Meinhof gang in Germany or devout Catholics from southern Italy turned into terrorist Red Brigades in a modern university in northern Italy, so early Russian terrorism came from those who apparently felt the need for absolute certainties but could no longer accept the older certainties provided by their societies.

Leo Tolstoy, the great novelist who was deeply antiterrorist, and Serge Kravchinsky, the émigré popularizer of this in the West, who was rather proterrorist, set the literary fashion for portraying terrorists when they both independently described Dimitry Lizogub, the first to adopt the label "terrorist" in Kiev, as a saint, whose long obituary published as a model and an incitement to czaricide in 1881 on the eve of the assassination of the czar began with a passage from St. Luke about giving up one's family to follow the master.

Second: This first turn to terrorism occurred at the end of a period of liberalization when the expectations of the educated had outrun the opportunities for reform within the system. Czar Alexander II, known to people of our tradition as the great liberator for freeing the serfs, introducing trial by jury, and a measure of local administrative autonomy in Russia, was not so much given credit by the utopian intellectuals for his original reforms as blamed for his subsequent hesitations.

Third: Terrorists used the new potentiality of the newspaper and wire service coverage of foreign events as a weapon against established domestic authority. In the late 1870's they turned almost every trial of terrorists into a countertrial of authority, presenting an appealing contrast between their own selfless dedication and the flabby self-indulgence of czarist society which they were continually indicting both by their words and, in a sense, by their example.

The revolutionaries on trial seemed to have been more aware than were the ruling authorities of the enormous potential for dramatization of their cause by appealing to foreign readers through the newly installed wire service reportage and by using newly acquired rights to public defense of the recently instituted trial by jury system.

Wire service reporters gave the terrorist a broad audience and produced a hypnotic fascination with their heroism and a tendency to overlook their crimes, just as television coverage may sometimes have inadvertently done in more recent days.

Fourth: Women played an important part in the moral validation of terrorism, at least of the original terrorists. It is not so characteristic of all subsequent movements. But on the opinion of

Nechaev, the original theorist of terrorism in Russia in this period, women would be either the best or the worst revolutionaries. Their capacity for dedication, compassion, and their willingness to undertake the most difficult and suicidal of assignments within the terrorist cause created a heightened emotional interest in and human sympathy with what otherwise might have seemed to the neutral public an ascetic impersonal organization.

The spectacle of placing a pregnant woman on trial who has been one of the terrorists in the assassination plan against Alexander II posed the czarist regime, for instance, with an excruciating dilemma and brought letters of protest to the new czar Alexander III not against the murder of his father but against any proposed execution of such an assassin.

Fifth: Perhaps the most decisive and historically fateful legacy of this intrusion of organized terrorism into Russian political culture was the generation of counterterrorism within and beyond the Russian Government. The interaction, interborrowing, and at times interpenetration of the extreme left with the extreme right became a characteristic of late Imperial Russia that profoundly undermined all efforts of moderate reformers to produce a humane constitutional society that might have come closer to realizing the Western ideals of liberty.

Just as the terrorists originally claimed to be only reacting to the oppressiveness of the Russian autocracy, so the beleaguered government turned to a kind of counterterrorism of its own beginning with the programs of the 1880's and carrying on with extra-legal organizations like the Black Hundreds and a florid growth of the Okhrana or secret police in ways that often moved beyond and outside the fragile legal system.

This original example of terrorism that we have discussed in the 1870's may shed some light on the perplexing question of how such fanatical movements can take root in a modern educated society. Terrorism served to unify a very socially diverse and disputatious group of young people by involving them collectively in violence which was made to seem noble and sublime. Terrorism here was clearly a product of conviction, not just random criminality, providing a heroic example of dedication to perplex the opposition and shame the uncommitted.

Terrorism also has been said by some authorities to compensate for the lack of ritual life in the atomized prosaic modern world. Certainly, terrorism provided the Russian intellectuals with a kind of baptism by fire, by trial as it were, into the revolutionary struggle somewhat in the manner represented in the famous film "Battle of Algiers." It also provided a kind of ritual for the mass media—the wire services of the late 19th century like the television channels of the late 20th seem to have a certain fascination with violence and even ritualized murder.

The great novels on terrorism, beginning with Dostoevsky's "Possessed" down to those of Conrad and Malraux seem to suggest there is a kind of exhilaration in this form of struggle. As the great writers conceived this ritual of revolutionary engagement, time often seems to stop and indeed start all over again for the terrorists, just as the new calendar adopted by the French revolutionaries late in 1792 when they turned from liberty to authoritarianism

began, as I have already pointed out, with the foundation of their state rather than the birth of Christ. And just as to many modern revolutionary movements take their name from a specific date, the May 12 Movement and the like, a date of which nowhere, the literal meaning of utopia, was believed to have become somewhere.

I cannot even begin to state the complex history of terrorist organization and activity among revolutionaries in this century since the appearance of the original Russian variant we have discussed here. I can only hint at some of the key problems that a conscientious open inquiry might seek to investigate dispassionately in order to get whatever guidance history may provide for the dangers we may face in the future from new variants of the terrorist tradition.

As heirs of the original, the older, more moderate tradition of revolution for liberty, we must recognize the sad fact that systematic terrorism has been adopted in the 20th century, unlike the 19th century, by national, as well as social revolutionary movements, by some of the revolutions for fraternity, as it were, in the Third World, no less than by revolutionaries for equality.

But more often than not, we tend to find the piecemeal adaptation of terrorist tactics rather than full terrorist movements, or else we find national liberation movements closer in many ways to the romantic and expressive violence of early 19th century national revolutionaries in Europe than to the ascetic terrorism of the original Russian model.

There would seem to be a number of important problems that we need to study more deeply and we need to investigate in more detail if there is ever to be an adequate analysis of the present problem.

We need first of all deep investigation of the doctrinal and psychological question of the relationship within Russian political culture itself between the terrorist legacy and the Marxist-Leninist tradition.

Though Marx was at several points of desperation willing to embrace terrorism and Lenin was proud of his older brother and more willing than Marx to embrace elitism and violent tactics, particularly during moments of struggle, the fact is that Marxism in Russia arose as a rival in the late 1880's and early 1890's to the terrorist traditional among Russian revolutionaries, and orthodox Soviet Marxism-Leninism has continuously rejected any serious strategic adaptation of terrorism in its formal doctrine.

Second is the complex question of the extent of the practical adaptation of terrorist tactics by communist governments, whatever their formal doctrine may be, and the precise history and nature of direct support both material and immaterial provided in more recent times by communist and other left revolutionary governments to terrorist movements outside their borders.

What is the nature and degree of strategic coordination of these powers with others like Cuba and Vietnam and the extent to which military successes by countries like Vietnam and Libya in more recent times may be interpreted more widely as vindications for a revolutionary strategy, more accommodating to terrorism than the classical doctrine may be in the U.S.S.R. in its formal articulation?

Third is the need for a clinically correct account, wherever possible, of the role, sequence, nature, and extent of counterterrorism by legally sanctioned or extra-legal activities of rightwing governments and movements to permit an accurate assessment of the nature and extent of right-left interaction and political polarization. This is particularly important in countries where there is some possibility for preserving or encouraging our own more moderate ideals of constitutional liberty.

There are, I believe, two reasons for deep concern that the kind of more professional, disciplined, and terrifying terrorism of the kind that Russia first produced in the period I have described and that has hit Italy, for instance, so hard but has largely avoided America in the last decade may increasingly threaten other advanced countries, including our own, in the decade or so ahead.

The first is the seeming decline in legitimacy of political authority in general and of the modern state in particular. It has been a characteristic of the modern state ever since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the end of feudal armies and religious wars that the central state exercised a monopoly on the use of the major means of violence within its borders. This monopoly was always qualified to some extent in America by a widespread sense of individual entitlement to weapons and has been further eroded recently by a decreasing sense of any responsibility, traditional moral and religious restraints, and the seemingly addictive fascination with violence in the media, the increasing profusion and diffusion of arms across and within national borders everywhere, and by a seeming growth among clamoring special interests of the belief that only direct and even bloody action at times can elicit any real responsiveness from the bloodless bureaucracies that seem to control our lives in distant places.

A second reason why terrorism may grow is simply the technological vulnerability of most modern urbanized civilizations, particularly our own, to the paralyzing effects of violence that are carefully targeted against key people or facilities. The special vulnerability of an urbanized yet open society may very well create in the years ahead an irresistible temptation for a kind of professional terrorism we have not on the whole yet seen in America. They could either threaten or damage our society from within or so terrorize us as to transform ourselves into a police state in order to defend ourselves.

I do not believe that increasing terrorism is inevitable or that we should terrorize ourselves by dwelling on it to the exclusion of many other pressing problems in the world. But we have also at times been too naive in the past about the darker aspects of revolutionary traditions different than our own. Scholars have sometimes tended either subtly to justify terrorism by insisting it was the unavoidable result of socioeconomic privations or effectively to dismiss it as a result of various psychological malformations. It is a profoundly serious phenomenon about which we have too many editorials and too little authentic scholarship.

The terrorist is the ultimately committed revolutionary, who places himself beyond all traditional moral and legal authority—and as such he poses a clear threat to all who value and in some

sense uphold such authority. We must resist them forcefully, yet we should not repressively overreact to them.

William Butler Yeats, one of the greatest poets of our language and our century, wrote one of his more powerful poems at a time when the historic homeland of our own traditions of moderation and liberty, Great Britain, was turning to the counterterrorism of the extra-legal black and tans in response to the preceding terror of the Irish revolutionaries.

Though deeply conservative politically, Yeats longed for something more than the tragic cycle of lawless revolution followed by extra-legal repression, and he warned as well that we might face a world where:

> Turning and turning in the widening gyre the falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, the blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere the ceremony of innocence is drowned; The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity.

Now, I am not without hope, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, that as the flames eventually die down, we will find on the burned out battlefields of equality and fraternity, the older seeds of freedom pushing up some of their own fresh shoots. The enduring struggle for liberty that preceded the causes of fraternity and equality is still, after all, honored in the rhetoric of these more authoritarian traditions of national and social revolution, and it is not impossible that the belief in secular revolution which has legitimized so much authoritarianism and authoritarian repression in the 20th century may prefigure dialitically some rediscovery of evolutionary politics that would revalidate freedom in the 21st.

But in the meantime we will surely face many challenges and confrontations not only from the Leninism of the powerful but from the terrorism of the powerless and from the frequent concurrence of interest, whatever the actual connection may be, between the two.

And if we as custodians of an older and better ideal and indeed deeper religious ideals continue to lack all conviction, we will be waiting passively by our television screens for the arrival of what Yeats called the "rough beast" in the last line of that same poem.

TOTAL COMMITMENT

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Billington. That was a most profound presentation, which we will study retrospectively in the weeks and perhaps months to follow. There is too much in it for one to derive perceptive questions so early. But we will ask you a few.

Do I detect in part of your conclusions about terrorism that once a group in a feeling of repression and incompleteness regarding ritual, regarding justice, if you will, takes on the cloak of violent revolution against the existing order, one of the unfortunate aspects of their odyssey from the idealistic beginnings of their involvement in terrorism to the animalistic end of it is derived from an abandonment of a source of moral principle, of a source of conscientious drive toward self-discipline, toward compassion?

Putting it another way, some can say with respect to Christian nations that have warred against one another, that there has been

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murderous manifestation in the Spanish Conquistadores and the Spanish Inquisition. In the wars between France and Spain, or England and Spain, two Christian nations fought against one another, could one say that it is not that there is something wrong with Christianity, or Judiasm, or Mohammedism, it is just that they have never been tried in working out differences between nations?

In other words, that the developed urge, the perceived and consciously nurtured urge within us to conform to some moral creed which results in fairness to other men probably has a favorable effect on behavior, all other things being equal in terms of environment, than a total absence of such an urge?

Now, I am getting about as deep as you were, and maybe not quite as articulate. What I am questioning you about is do these people, in becoming totalitarianly atheistic, pagan, as you said, then toss an anchor to windward in terms of sanity and compassion? Do you regard that as a strong and dangerous characteristic of a fully developed terrorist?

Mr. BILLINGTON. Well, yes; I think there are many questions involved in what you have said. I think it is certainly true that the true terrorist, as these early Russian examples indicate, developed a kind of total and ultimate commitment to their cause, which is similar in many respects to the total ultimate commitment that theoretically one has in an ethically demanding religion such as Christianity, Judaism, or Islam.

It is also true that they borrow from and are in a way deeply influenced by the model of this preexisting religion they are in a sense replacing. Nothing offends revolutionaries more, particularly those in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, than to develop this analogy with religion, because they believe it is essential to this kind of an ultimate commitment system that it be described as a science, not as a religion.

But in a structural sense, and indeed in the sense of borrowing of these original terrorists in particular, there is a very heavy use of religious imagery and drawing on the kinds of examples of dedication, martyrdom, and the sort of metaphors, their own self-image drawing on their own tradition. You see that also in terrorists arising from the Islamic tradition in more recent years.

So I think that this is a factor that one has to take into consideration. I think it is also important in differentiating. At least the Marxist tradition, in its own self-image, views itself as the heirs to the scientific pretention of the enlightenment and not as the imitators of what they could consider utopian religious socialism and that sort of thing. They reject that same set of metaphors and images insofar as it is adopted within the terrorist tradition.

So there is a difference in their image of who they are and what they stand for, even if there may be striking resemblances if you look at it dispassionately from the outside.

But there are so many questions, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure I have focused on the ones you were most concerned about.

Senator DENTON. I would have to say the same thing about your statement. We could study it for years and not plumb the depths of the many questions which could be raised about it. I am amazed at the similarity, however, between that which you acknowledge to be

a somewhat dated, if one were to put it in a denigrated way, dated analysis, I am amazed at the similarity between those characteristics you have ascribed to terrorism back in the 1870's up toward the 20th century and those which Claire Sterling and other authors attribute to it as characteristics today.

You have said you have not had enough time to read into the contemporary scene, but I assure you that the similarity is so striking as to be amazing. You have not read, for example, Claire Sterling's book, "The Terror Network"?

Mr. BILLINGTON. No; I have not. I read a shortened version of it in the New York Times. But in my position, I am afraid with the amount of things I have on my table and the seriousness of problems like this, I have had to defer that and other readings to such time as I will be able to get during the summer. But I hope to read it more thoroughly.

Senator DENTON. I believe that my prediction that you will find the similarity amazing will be borne out. And I am very anxious to get more deeply into that which you have been into so much, if only to learn some of the basic lessons from that which you have learned.

I have a question which I am sure you will understand readily. And that is, having read some Tolstoy myself and a good bit of Dostoevsky, you referred to a Dostoevsky book which I have not read which dealt with terrorism and you mentioned a Tolstoy reference to a terrorist as a "saint." These have not come across my experience in the past, and I have always felt—and I would like your comment on this—that it would be unfair to relate what one might term the national characteristics of the Russian people, the national principles, the pervasive and agelong traits of the Russian people as necessarily in any way evil or relatively bad compared to other parts of the world or other nationalities.

Indeed, my own feeling, from reading Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and so forth, particularly "War and Peace," and what I thought to have been other authoritative books about the characteristics of the Russian people, what I see as their differentiating characteristics might be a heartland kind of patience, a patience in dealing perhaps, derived perhaps from having dealt so long and so urgently with the extremes of climate, with the difficulties of extracting from that soil which is somewhat unproductive, with the deficiency in agriculture.

I have always felt that they were patient and that such unfairness that may have been imposed upon them by what may unfairly be called a growingly corrupt regime was borne so long by them in that patience as a group, as a whole population, that the final manifestation of resistance against what they perceived to be unfairness was that much more explosive and that much more extreme.

I have always felt that if the people came to perceive the Czar as ruler as so corrupt and to perceive people like Rasputin as so corrupt in representing religion that they were susceptible to a pitch in which a Marxist would say: "Well, you can't trust a ruler. You have to go to an oligarchy. And you cannot trust. If religion is this bad, then there cannot be a god. You must find it in science. You must find it in communality of humanity," and that this

fraternalism of which you speak would be represented by the term "comrade," perhaps.

Now, that is the way I have been looking at it, and I am not nearly as well read in it. I have studied Russian for 3 years and have read somewhat about Russia. But I would be interested in your answer to the question.

Do you think that the Russian nationality, per se, was necessarily or is necessarily something which would probably be the source of the development of terrorism, or do you see this as an incidental political, philosophical development which just coincidentally occurred there?

Mr. BILLINGTON. Yes, I am glad you brought up the subject, Mr. Chairman, because I think it is important to stress, or at least I feel in my own study of Russian history and the Russian people and their culture that it is a great disservice to the richness and complexity of their heritage to identify terrorism, for example, or indeed revolutionary commitment as some kind of natural or foreordained outcome of their society and their people.

I think they have a complex heritage, like most of us. It is a big continentwide civilization with many nationalities and many strains within it. But the dominant Russian one produced a more authoritarian form of revolutionary protest than many, in part because they had a more authoritarian political system against which to protest.

But there was, considering the problems—and there has been some tendency in history to exaggerate the authoritarianism of the czars which was not in most respects comparable to that which succeeded them, but it is rather remarkable the degree of development of legal and constitutional institutions in the late imperial period. So there was that tradition, although there was only about 15 years in which they had a culture which was free of censorship or had any serious electoral processes going on at a nationwide level.

So this first tradition of which I spoke that is more analogous to our own never took deep root, although it is surprising the extent to which the interest in it and responsiveness to it continues in many ways under the surface but not all that far under the surface, even under the difficult conditions in the U.S.S.R.

Moreover, there is, I think, not only this pseudoreligion, this religion of Marxism, or this religion-like structure of discipline that has been sometimes described as "orthodoxy without Christianity" that they have adopted and made of Marxism-Leninism a means of social discipline and a kind of intellectual laborsaving device. But to some extent it sort of preserved and reconstituted the bureaucratic, hierarchical, and oligarchical modes of rule that were there, but were not the only things that were there.

What is interesting, I think, is that elements of the older faith still survive. There is much interest, I think, in the various religious communities in the Soviet Union and indeed in other countries that are ruled by this kind of political religion—interest in the older, more authentic religions.

So I think there is a kind of rediscovery of the sacred in private life that is more widespread than has generally been realized or appreciated and that draws on the deeper traditions of orthodoxy,

the traditions of long suffering, the traditions of adherence to and drawing strength from a deeply liturgical and ultimately rather private religion in a situation where the public culture has always been beyond the ability of most people to affect.

So I agree there is a richness there, so we should not easily equate—and this is very important in discussing, I think, revolutionary movements generally and terrorist ones in particular—they are always specific, they always arise in a specific culture, and they are not to be seen as some foreordained inevitability of either the process of modernization or the culture of any particular country.

Incidentally, the Tolstoy story, which is not so well known as it should be in this literature, is called "The Divine and the Human" and it describes a terrorist who—it is a rather moving short story written by Tolstoy, who, of course, had his own deep opposition to violence in all forms--and it describes a terrorist model called Svetlogub, modeled on Lizogub and clearly designed to suggest that to its reader.

And it tells the story of his believing ultimately that the true expression of the ideals he had originally sought were found in a new sectarian form of Christianity, which is what Tolstoy himself adhered to. Realizing that but realizing his culpability for the crimes he had committed under this earlier more revolutionary banner, he commits suicide. So there is a sort of tragic ending to it, which Tolstoy represents.

But the image of the terrorist was a kind of martyrdom, going to his death and not renouncing his faith but indeed going to his death in a manner which one of the terrorists described. She said: "It is easier for us to die than to kill." And there was that kind of ability. They were seeking a martyrdom that would validate the cause.

One of the students of this whole phenomenon has touched one of its deepest levels by saying that the motives of the pure become the justification for the rest. And it is important for us to realize who cannot sympathize with this or identify with it, but there is for many people a kind of purity of motive involved even if the outcome seems horrendous to those who look at it from a different perspective.

Senator DENTON. Claire Sterling's analysis of that development begins or starts a terrorist off with extreme idealism, moralism, and then indicates from her studies that she thinks that the very violence and bloodletting in which they involve themselves slowly turns them into an almost knee jerk sadist and one whose joie de vivre and raison d'etre becomes killing, for what that is worth in the modern context. That is the development which she repeatedly asserts in her book.

Solzhenitsyn, would you agree with him, sir, when he says—and I mention this in this context. We are really studying on this subcommittee the effect on the Soviet Union, and this is one part of the study on international terrorism, the influence or lack thereof, the limits of it, and manner of it, and so forth.

But there is another kind of terrorism one might postulate about the Soviet Union, and that is the degree to which terrorism is a factor within its own borders. And Solzhenitsyn talks to us about that.

And I wonder, in your great degree of study, whether you would agree with this. He says:

> I am not concerned here with those who cherish, glorify and defend communism to this day. To such people I have nothing to say. Yet there are many others who are aware that communism is an evil and menace to the world but who have nevertheless failed to grasp its implacable nature. Such individuals in their capacities as policy advisers and political leaders are even now committing fresh blunders which will inevitably have lethal repercussions in the future.

He goes on:

> A common mistake is the failure to understand the radical hostility of communism to mankind as a whole, the failure to realize that communism is irredeemable, that there exists no better variant of communism, that it is incapable of growing kinder, that it cannot survive as an ideology without using terror, and that consequently to coexist with communism on the same planet is impossible. Either it will spread cancerlike to destroy mankind or else mankind will have to rid itself of communism.

Now, I realize that in the way in which you have been studying and discussing today that may not necessarily have been evident to a citizen of the Soviet Union. But Solzhenitsyn says that is the way things are today. And the book "KGB" indicates this terrorism which he says they cannot exist without is applied within the Soviet Union itself by the KGB, the GRU, by the general security police tentacles of the Government.

I myself, having observed the effects of that kind of terroristic inhibition exerted by a government in North Vietnam on its own people, the citizens of which elicited more sympathy from me than my fellow prisoners plight, I feel that is a reality which this Nation, with its blessings, has not begun to perceive in degree and nature.

I think terrorism goes all the way in its physical manifestation from an expression on the intimidator's face, a frown, a word of warning, an admonition or caution, to torture, to what Solzhenitsyn describes and what Sakharov describes as being done in the psychiatric wards almost unlimited now as to opposed to perhaps when you were studying it, an unlimited willingness to indulge in brutality and terrorism of a very personal sense as well as an international sense.

Do you have any comment on that, sir?

Mr. BILLINGTON. Mr. Chairman, there are a number of very deep and important questions you raise. There are, I think, from my point of view, two common mistakes in dealing with this general problem. One is the mistake of assuming that there is nothing fundamentally wrong and deeply perverted, mixed up on communism; and the other is assuming that there are not some capabilities of modification and change to be found among many who may for one reason or another call themselves or be labeled as Communists.

In other words, if I may use religious analogy, it is the old thing of hating the sin but being open to loving the sinner.

Senator DENTON. I agree with you on both counts.

Mr. BILLINGTON I do not mean to say that in a moralistic way either, because I think it is an essential insight of the religion to which I adhere, that sin is a fairly universally distributed phenomenon and is not confined to any political system or ideology.

But let me isolate if I can and make some distinctions in this line of thought. I think communism is based—I agree with Solzhenitsyn in that communism is, in my view, based upon some fundamental, metaphysical mistakes. It has abrogated things to a political system that simply do not belong there. And in my view, the "ism" is fundamentally wrong.

Moreover, those who exercise and use the "ism" as an exercise of power in this world are not above using terror, which I would distinguish as an instrument of government manipulation and control, as distinguished from terrorism as a campaign against an existing authority. But they use terror in a political system, and I think that that sense of fundamental, clear, uncomplicated opposition to something which is metaphysically wrong has to be extended to those who have in a sense renounced their common humanity and become passive instruments, receptacles, manipulated tools of its terrorist arms.

Now, I think that does not mean that in the more complex world of dealing with states and systems and particularly in dealing with the variety of political cultures in which this great metaphysical mistake has embedded itself that we can avoid the complexity and moral ambiguity of the political process of which you and your colleagues are far more aware than I.

And it seems to me that there we have to deal with and learn to live with and sympathetically keep ourselves both open to and encouraging of various evolutionary patterns among Communists. And whether you look from Yugoslavia, to Poland, to China, in various ways these societies—particularly obviously the Polish example, but to some extent things in Hungary—there is a great variety of human possibility.

And one of the things, if I just may say one more word about this, one of the things that must be watched out for and guarded against in a study of this phenomenon is a kind of morbid fascination with them. It is like watching the cobra: you become paralyzed and hypnotized. And while I have not read this recent literature and am not prepared to pass any kind of judgment on the basis of hearsay, I think there is an almost irresistible tendency to look for—I mean, if you are looking for connections, you tend to find them. They may be there, but one has to impose a particularly rigorous kind of scholarly scrutiny.

One has to overcome the reluctance of many people to admit that dark connections exist, but one has also to guard against the inevitable fascination of someone studying the phenomenon with overdrawing the extent and the nature of these connections.

And I think the same is true in differentiating between communism as a sort of pseudoreligious overpretentious, largely, I believe, outdated ideology, as well as those who are, so to speak, the inquisitors of this dying pseudoreligious system who also have to be resisted and the large number of human beings who for one reason or another are caught up in this and must live with it and some of whom may even have still—although this must be declining number—idealistic reasons for believing in it. With these, one must deal in a variety of more pragmatic ways.

That is not a simple answer. But as I try to differentiate our tradition from theirs, we have to live with complexity, whereas

these revolutionary traditions always tend to reduce things to a kind of radical simplicity.

Senator DENTON. I thoroughly agree with you, sir, that theoretically, and in terms of all normal human inspiration, you can get a sinner to repent, you can get a Communist to moderate, you can get a sinful capitalist to moderate. I would not equate the degree of evil in our system to the degree of evil unfortunately in theirs. But I would certainly grant all the major points that you have just made.

I would think that Solzhenitsyn, being extremely intense and having come from a persecuted and suffering state himself, would be expectedly extreme in his admonitions. However, they might not be entirely idle, because, as you have quoted the poet in the real world of international politics, one must look not only at the possibilities but what is actually happening in terms of which is prevailing over which or which is infringing more upon the other as the years go by.

And we would have to look at the map and see what has been happening to the world over the past 20 or 30 years to see the degree to which that system is spreading itself. And I guess we would warn ourselves that the best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate intensity. That is an ideological postulation worth attending, I believe.

To give an example of what is at stake in that context, this man Carlos—I will not bother you with identifying him further, but many of us who have read the book and we have had discussions on this man Carlos in the last hearing—he said about the Palestinian situation over there that the only war that counts is the one between socialism and capitalism and he establishes that the Marxist interest, the terrorist interest, is just to prevent the formation of a permanent peace to keep things going until the following things start to happen:

He says the Palestinians have their uses in that war—this is the one between Israel and Egypt—he said they have their uses because the homeland they hanker after happens to float on a boundless bed of oil. Thanks to the Palestine resistance, therefore: "We have the possibility of blowing up all the oilfields in the Arabian Gulf from Kuwait to Oman, Saudi Arabia and Khuzistan, maybe even Venezuela. Petroleum is the weapon that can inflict the mortal wound on imperialism."

He said that some years ago a very doctrinaire fundamentalist theorist really as well as practitioner of terrorism, and then just the other day in the newspaper, perhaps not noticed as much as it could have been, was a statement by a current terrorist who is in the Mideast and this was an article by Fahroud Nassar, an Associated Press writer a week or two ago.

He has a man named Nayef Hawatmek, leader of the Marxist group over there saying:

> Oil supplies to the capitalist West will be brought to a halt if the Israeli enemy attempts PLO destruction, the Mideast oil wells will go up in flames. This is not a hollow threat. It will be translated to action by our freedom strugglers in the Middle East, not only Palestinians.

So in addition to the academic theoretical and as fair and objective as we can make it contemplation of the possibilities, we also

have the realities of how the balance is shifting. And I agree with you we must look very carefully at that.

For example, Poland must be a very encouraging development, but we have not seen the end of that. Perhaps it will end as it did in Hungary in October 1956. Who knows. I hope to God it will not.

Would you develop a little bit further, sir, the distinctions between the revolutions for liberty, fraternity, and equality, and their connotational relevance with terrorism and communism, which as I understand it, liberty you see as our kind of revolution over here, the one we had. How do you assess the relationship between the equality and fraternity part with the Communist revolutionary movement and terrorism?

Mr. BILLINGTON. Well, there is, of course, as with any arbitrary way of organizing history, there is some overlap and so forth. But basically, I believe, as I have tried to indicate in this chart and explain in my testimony, that there was really a qualitative difference between the revolutions for liberty with their limited objectives, their concept of a return to a preexisting natural order, and their lack of ultimate metaphysical pretentiousness, and these other two more authoritarian, more centralizing kinds of revolution that arose in the course of the French revolutionary struggle and have generally dominated the international and revolutionary imagination.

One of our greatest difficulties in understanding revolutionary change, I guess, popularly among ordinary people, one of the greatest difficulties in understanding the recurrence and nature of revolutionary movements in the outside world is our inability, of course, to understand the social and economic conditions out of which revolutionary situations and revolutionary desperation arise in parts of the world whose physical problems and privations we have little ability to understand.

But one of the greatest difficulties of scholars and intellectuals in understanding revolutionary movements is their unwillingness to acknowledge, and in some cases their parochial inability to understand, the profound difference between the revolutionary traditions that came out of the high French Revolution and our own American revolutionary tradition.

How many otherwise reputable scholars are constantly analogizing someone to George Washington or Benjamin Franklin when they in fact come out of a far more authoritarian Jacobin type of revolutionary tradition.

Now, the point I was trying to make is that terrorism as a consciously adopted doctrine of sublime and disciplined political violence arose in the social revolutionary tradition, not in the national revolutionary tradition in the 19th century, although I believe that once the example was there, there was an enormous echo effect from this early Russian example in various parts of Europe and even in the Middle East to some extent.

And it has tended—the terrorist example and many aspects of terrorist tactics have been in more recent times also been adopted by national revolutionary movements of the kind you mention. Sometimes it is impossible to tell whether it is predominantly a national or social revolutionary movement.

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So I think this has become a problem in a number of countries and movements in the Third World in our time, whereas, for instance, the kind of revolutionary violence exercised by, say, Poles and Italians rebelling against the traditional monarchies of Europe in the early 19th century also had a great deal of violence, but they thought of the national liberation movement of a broader sort and not of the kind of selective political violence designed to terrorize the populace. They thought more of raising the consciousness of the populace, raising the sense of national unity. And so they had a kind of more expressive, spontaneous approach to violence, a less calculating and disciplined one.

The problem in the present day is national revolutionary movements in the Third World are tempted too in various ways, which always must be studied in the concrete particular case, by the availability of these kinds of precedents for use.

But again, I think, there is a danger of using this term "terrorism" much too imprecisely. Much of that violence in the Third World is very analogous to the preterrorist violence that was used by groups of military conspirators in the 1820's or by revolutionary poets and generals in the nationalist movements of the early 19th century.

So I think that while this phenomenon of international terrorism and circulating terrorists is a terrifying one and one which must be studied very closely, I think one has to study very closely in a lot of particular contexts how much a terrorist strategy is controlling a political movement. And one also has to distinguish to some extent, particularly in the Third World, between the bombastic and flamboyant rhetoric that people use and the realities of what they are actually doing.

It is very dangerous to impose counterterror or preemptive measures against simply what somebody says doctrinally if they have not actually done it, because then you are violating the whole principles of our own legal tradition which judge people on what they do, really, not on what they say, and you also threaten so to circumvent what people are going to be able to say in a free society that you transform your own society in the very act of combating the forces which would undermine it.

I am sorry to be so complexifying, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. Not at all.

Regarding your last point, Uruguay was a typical case in point in which a terrorist uprising caused a previously liberal government, by South American standards, to become more authoritarian, more repressive, to institute curfews, martial law, and so forth, and then in the deliberate escalation of the terrorism to cause the government to become even repressive, so that the populace would finally revolt against it, which is the typical pattern of the terroristic overthrow of a government.

You had, instead, the replacement of the previous relatively liberal regime with a successful rightwing authoritarian army-dominated government which, as a reward for those who successfully held off the terrorists, the left wingers imposed a 15-year moratorium on civil rights. And that is not an ideal solution.

Unfortunately, with the terrorism continuing to infiltrate and threaten, it leaves a government with few alternatives as to how much liberalism it can proceed with, I would think.

It seems to me that some of the major points you have made to us this morning are: It was in Russia that the new, more ascetic and impersonal concept of calculated revolutionary violence first supplanted the old ideal of romatic semi-suicidal direct action.

Another, in the terms of why we asked you to come—and we were very well rewarded—you say it is interesting to note the word "terrorist" was apparently first introduced in Russia during intensive discussions about revolutionary strategy among young intellectuals in Kiev and a new alternative of "urban terrorism" was advanced by a small group who adopted the name of "terrorist" as a badge of pride. And terrorism became the dominant strategy of "The People's Will" organization.

You have been most prudent in your qualifications regarding not labeling the Russian people as any more evil than any other, and not to get too simplistic about what terrorism portends and overreact to it.

We do have some terrorism developments in the world. I agree with you that just because this man Nayef Hawatmek says the Mideast oil wells will go up on flames is a far cry from that happening. However, the difference in the positioning of forces that would make that possible are significant between the time when Carlos the Jackal first postulated that objective and when this fellow Nayef Hawatmek says it is imminent.

There is quite a difference in the situation in terms of humanity, military force, order of battle, and so forth. And what is going on in the Mideast in terms of events at the moment, we do have Qadhafi having been present personally in the Syrian-Lebanese area, we do have extremely modern surface-to-air missiles there. There are charges, some of which were denied by even our own intelligence resources which were later confirmed by no less an authority than Arafat himself regarding the presence of this or that kind of force or nationality in that area.

So as you would readily agree, we cannot be blind to the security realities of the matter. And that is the job of this committee. We are supposed to be looking at security and terrorism, and our look at terrorism deals only with its relationship with our security in the intermediate. We will have to look at it in an academic sense to derive as much as we can from learned people such as yourself about its origins and its communistic aspects.

You have been most helpful to us this morning, sir.

I want to relay a question from Senator East. He said:

> Your remarks about the neopagan revolution for blood brotherhood or universal equality in the French Revolution and the applied science of Dr. Guillotin suggest an idealogic link between the ideas of the French Revolution and 20th century nazism.

That is Senator East's statement. And he asks would you care to comment?

Mr. BILLINGTON. The questions of the links between fascism and nazism and the revolutionary tradition is a very complex one. Again, it is essential to the self-image of the revolutionary left that facism and nazism are products of cultural as well as socio-econom-

ic roots that are quite different from those of revolutions of the left. And there is, of course, some truth in this.

However, I believe that both in the dynamics of the evolution of fascism, which would have been impossible without the splitting of the left by the Communist International at the Leghorn conference prior to the rise of Mussolini and in the case of the rise of Hitler, where the Communist International was again denouncing the Social Democrats as social Fascists and therefore splitting the forces trying to hold together the fragile Weimar Republic.

Therefore, in the dynamics of the emergence of the Nazi Republic, there was a dialectic way in which the Communist strategy aided the Nazi victory even if they were ultimately to suffer heavily from it.

Moreover, I think there is a way in which the tradition of revolutionary nationalism to which I have alluded fit in in some ways and reached its climax in Fascist revolutions of the right, just as the tradition of revolution for equality reached its climax in the Communist victories on the left.

I would point, moreover, to the fact that the symbiotic interaction—this dialectic interaction between the extremes of right and left—is dramatically evident in the case of Mussolini, who had his revolutionary and tactical tutelage as an activist editor and organizer in the radical left before he became the original Fascist. And there is a kind of relationship between the early idealistic form of fascism in Italy, which they called "fascismo della prima ora," the "fascism of the first hour," and the mature fascism of Mussolini's dictatorship, let alone the racist, really thoroughly viking, neopagan racism of Hitler's nazism.

There is an analogy in the same kind of development on the left between the idealism of the early communist revolutionaries and the realization under Stalin of a kind of mature totalitarianism and terror at about the same time in the 1930's. It is interesting in that the mature totalitarian States in Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia both tried to use elements of both the left and right revolutionary ideology.

Nazism, you remember, means "national socialism," whereas Stalin's mature version of communism was "socialism in one country," and it had a highly Russian and nationalistic coloration.

So I think there are important ways in which these traditions feed into both forms of mature state authoritarianism, although there are, of course, profound differences between the two as well.

Senator DENTON. You mentioned in this context relating French and Nazis. We have your mention of the Black Hundreds and Lenin mentioned some words here which became standard procedure for Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups. He said:

> The fight against the Black Hundreds is an excellent type of military action which will train the soldiers of the revolutionary army, give them their baptism of fire and be at the same time of tremendous benefit to the revolution.

That quote comes from a book by a fellow named Herbert Romerstein, who is on the Permanent Select Committee of Intelligence. Mr. Romerstein goes on to say:

> These tactics were developed by both the communists and Nazis in Germany during the 1920's and 1930's. Robberies, beatings, street killings, and the assassinations of prominent moderate officials including police officials became common occurrences. The communist movement began its paramilitary violent activities in

1918 as the Red Soldiers Union. By 1921 the Nazis began organizing their storm troopers under the convenient pretext of fighting communist terror with their own terror. Each used the other as an excuse for violence.

We are beginning to tie your era into the present era and note the parallel between black and red terrorism, as it is presently referred to. We are of the belief in this subcommittee that although terrorism, per se, had not been originally a Marxist concept. The Soviets, starting in about 1964, in their pragmatism, began to perceive that both black and red terrorism were effective as far as governments were concerned; namely, in destabilization of western democracies, not to mention Third World governments. But in terms of the larger democratic-versus-communistic struggle, if you will, they perceived it to be a good bet to start backing them.

And we have traced through a number of sources what we consider to be unmistakable signs of an accelerated involvement and accelerated influence direct and indirect from the Soviet Union through their so-called satellites and surrogates to further terrorism.

And most importantly, perhaps, for our own immediate security interests, Castro, after the revolution was pressured by the Soviets to increase the exportation of communism into this hemisphere. So they pressured him economically, according to information we have. They sent a KGB general down there to supervise the activities and pretty much took over the lead.

And although we now say Castro has sort of bent to that, that appears to be similar to the situation in Nicaragua and perhaps in El Salvador. You seem to have some comments you wish to make, sir.

Mr. BILLINGTON. As I said, I really have not done my homework in these more recent problems, and I am not sure how much I would know if I had.

Senator DENTON. Do not knock us all the way down if you have not done your homework.

Mr. BILLINGTON. I would want to note some caution about continuously referring to terrorism as some form of unitary phenomenon. In a sense, communism is; at least Soviet communism is. It is embedded in a political system and a whole bureaucratic cast of expositors, advocates, and functionaries. Terrorism is a much more amorphous thing, and it has got to be rather more, I think, precisely defined. There are a lot of international roving terrorists, and there are a lot of types of use of political violence and tactics of terrorism.

But terrorism, as I was describing it in this original Russian example, is a conscious controlling strategy for political warfare. There would be a heavy burden of proof on anyone contending—I mean there is a heavy burden of proof on producing—that there has been some kind of fundamental change in both Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which makes tactical accommodations but not strategic ones to terrorism and which in its embodiment in Soviet political culture has tended, at least up until recent times—and I think it has to be shown how in recent times they have departed from it—to be very cautious in getting themselves not just committed in any obvious and traceable way but even involved in kinds of movements and kinds of activities which risk what they called spontaneity—that is to say, risk a kind of lack of control—unless these are

very much more tightly controlled than one senses from the highly tentative and hypothetical nature of much of the discussion.

Unless they are tightly controlled, they would have to be undertaken with considerable modification of both the cautious political habits of the aging Soviet leaders as they have generally been exercised and the tradition, the doctrinal tradition and formally stated precepts of Marxism-Leninism.

Now, either or both of these may have been modified. And certainly there is much to be alarmed about, as you point out, in Soviet activity throughout the world. But I am simply introducing a note of caution in the overuse of the word terrorism as a helpful and meaningful way of describing the variety of serious problems and the relationship of the Soviet Union to them that we may face.

URBAN GUERRILLA TEXTBOOK

Senator DENTON. Yes; in fact, that was my attitude as I began these investigations. I have been alarmed to find that terrorism is not quite as amorphous as I had thought it to be. For example, there is a textbook called "The Mini Manual of the Urban Guerrilla," which was written by a man named Marighella, Carlos Marighella. It is found in every terrorist training camp, and believe it or not, they exist. There are hundreds of thousands, if not millions, who have gone through these. They exist in South Yemen, they exist in Cuba, they exist in Libya.

This handbook, which is very, very detailed, is found not only in all of these places as well as in satellites of the Soviet Union, where these training programs are undertaken, but have even been found more recently in the United States.

So there is a textual commonality now to the tactics. And I must agree with you that the strategy is by no means unified. My perception at the moment is, as I have previously mentioned, the Soviets have just made a rough bet that on balance, black and red terrorism, both of which use this handbook, by the way, is doing more harm, much more harm to the other side and almost no harm to their side.

I have been amazed to find that the IRS with many well-meant Catholics in the United States——

Mr. BILLINGTON. The Internal Revenue Service?

Senator DENTON. The IRA. A Freudian slip. The IRA is by no means a little Irish move for freedom. It has not only been subverted and perverted by the leftwing terrorists but has been taken over by them. The Provisional IRA is now up to no good whatever. They are not trying to do anything but disturb the tranquility of the government in the United Kingdom and keep things boiling there.

These have been revelations to me, sir, I assure you. I started with objectivity and exactly the same attitude I would have had were I as learned as you about the past. I was not totally unlearned about it, but I knew that Marx was not a terrorist by nature. I knew the conservative manner in which the communist strategies developed in terms of the 27-moves-ahead chess game, and you are not going to rely on some nut terrorist to get your things done for you. But there has been a slowly developing recognition and a consequent development of investment in and increas-

ing interest in the terrorist movement worldwide on the part of the Soviet Union, in my view, to date.

And I would ask, I would beseech, you to take a look at this evidence. And I agree that the burden of proof is heavy. One must undertake it with solemn effort and objectivity.

Beyond the shadow of a doubt, I am convinced, however, to date of what I have just told you. And I will not be simplistic about what we do about it. I do not say that terrorism is a major involvement in the United States at this time. I do believe it is a major involvement worldwide in a manner which is threatening to our interest and does deserve continued study.

You have been extremely helpful in developing the purpose of today's hearing. And I am sure any scholar in the world would have been impressed by the quality of your testimony.

For your information and those here, we will hear tomorrow from Dr. Stefan Possony, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. He will be dealing with the more modern developments, taking up from about the time you leave off. Dr. Possony is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution of War and Peace, as I mentioned. He serves on the editorial board of Orbus and is the author of many books, including "Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary." He was professor of international politics at Georgetown from 1946 to 1961 and holds a Ph. D. from the University of Vienna.

I want to thank you again, sir, and again say farewell to you and your two sons.

This hearing stands in recess until 10 a.m., tomorrow.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, June 12, 1981.]

BIOGRAPHY OF JAMES H. BILLINGTON

Dr. Billington holds a B.A. degree from Princeton and was valedictorian of the class of 1950. He received a D. Phil. from Oxford, where he was a Rhodes scholar at Balliol College. He served in the U.S. Army, 1953-6, and began his teaching career as a history instructor at Harvard in 1957. Subsequently he served at Harvard as assistant professor of history and research fellow at the Russian Research Center. In 1962, he went to Princeton and was appointed professor of history in 1964. Dr. Billington has been a Guggenheim Fellow; a McCosh Faculty Fellow of Princeton University; guest lecturer at the University of Leningrad, the University of Puerto Rico, and leading universities in Western Europe; and guest research professor at the Institute of History, Moscow; the University of Helsinki; and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.

A Phi Beta Kappa, he is a director of the Association of American Oxonians, a past director of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and P.E.N. He is on the editorial advisory board of Foreign Affairs and Theology Today. He is the author of Mikhailovsky and Russian Populism (1958), "The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture" (1966), and "Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith" (1980). He has written widely in Life, Foreign Affairs, and other professional and popular journals. In 1973 he was historian-host of a series of scholarly discussions on the Humanities Film Forum on nationwide educational television. He was also guest commentator for CBS on the summit meetings of 1972-3; was special consultant to the Chase Manhattan Bank on East-West matters, 1971-3; and has consulted on documentary and international programming with NBC and ABC.

From 1971-6, he was a member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, which has authority over all academic exchanges with 110 countries under the Fulbright-Hays Act. He was elected and served as Chairman of the Board from 1971-3; was instrumental in initiating the new series of Lincoln Lectureships set up to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the program; and was convocation chairman of the interna-

tional Bicentennial Conference in May 1976, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Fulbright Program.

Since September 1973, he has been director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. This is the congressionally created official national memorial to Woodrow Wilson, which is located in the original red "Castle" building of the Smithsonian Institution and is an international institute for advanced study dedicated to producing advanced scholarship and interacting "the world of learning and the world of public affairs." It is a unique "living memorial" to a head of state—an institute for advanced study run through open competition with intellectual leadership exercised directly by the scholar-director without benefit of an in-house faculty. Under his directorship, a major set of regionally focused international programs has been established at The Wilson Center, beginning with the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies in 1974 and the Latin American Program in 1976. The meetings program has expanded to about 250 a year; and the Wilson Quarterly, which he founded at the Center in 1976, has now more than 100,000 paid subscribers.

He has recently served on academic visiting committees for Yale University, Georgetown University, Indiana University, and the University of Pittsburgh; is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Council on Learning and of the Bacon House Foundation; and is vice chairman of the Board of Trustees of St. Albans School.

He visited Yugoslavia, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. in October 1976 to conduct program review prior to the negotiation of new bilateral cultural agreements; visited Japan as distinguished guest scholar of the Japan Foundation, meeting on cultural matters with the prime minister of Japan and other officials in November 1976; and accompanied the official delegation of the U.S. House of Representatives to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in April 1979.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SOVIET TERRORISM

FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeremiah Denton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JEREMIAH DENTON

Senator DENTON. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. This is a continuation on the subject of historical antecedents of Soviet terrorism.

My senatorial colleagues probably will not make it in today; perhaps Senator Leahy, but since the Senate is not in session he may return to his home State. Senator East is chairing a hearing. Senator Biden is still tending to his new baby daughter, and Senator Hatch is still trying to untangle the moneys in Labor and Human Resources. So, it may be a solo hearing again this morning.

I would like to welcome Dr. Stefan Possony, our witness and I will make my opening statement. Dr. Possony, incidentally, is accompanied by Samuel T. Francis of the Heritage Foundation, and now with Senator East's staff.

Today's hearing should assist us in better understanding current Soviet involvement in international terrorism. Yesterday, you will recall, the subcommittee heard from Dr. James Billington, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Dr. Billington, in his articulate and concise testimony, traced the development and early history of European revolutionary movements with their terrorist components during the 18th and 19th centuries up to the 1890's. He stated that terrorism in its present form is a product of the modern revolutionary tradition which has arisen and developed within the last 200 years.

He further made the point that it was in Russia that the new, more ascetic, and impersonal concept of calculated revolutionary violence first supplanted the old ideal of romantic, semisuicidal direct action against alleged tyrants. According to Dr. Billington, the word "terrorism" was first adopted as a conscious badge of pride by a revolutionary group who utilized the strategy of urban terrorism at the end of the 1870's, just before they launched the most spectacular program of political assassination in the 19th century, culminating in the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881.

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I would like to set the record a little bit straighter in view of a press report today regarding yesterday's hearing. The report quotes Dr. Billington as urging that, "rigorous scholarly scrutiny" be applied to suggestions that Soviet leaders had overcome doctrinal inhibitions about terrorism as a revolutionary technique. Orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology, he said, "has continuously rejected any serious strategic use of terrorism in its formal doctrine."

I dare say that Dr. Billington did say those words of which approximately a dozen are in quotes, but I am not sure that that represents—and that is the only reference to what Dr. Billington said—a balanced presentation of what Dr. Billington had to offer.

It is true that Dr. Billington urged that "rigorous scholarly scrutiny" be applied to evidence tending to support the contention that the Soviets had overcome early inhibitions about the use of terrorism strategically as a revolutionary technique. It is important to note, however, that it was clear from Dr. Billington's testimony and from his book that all he was stating was that there should be fundamental documentation to support the thesis that the Soviets are supporting international terrorism.

While it is also true that he stated, "orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology has rejected the rise of terrorism in its formal doctrine and pronouncements," he also stated that Lenin in much of his practice, as well as in his writings, advocated the use of terrorism as a political tool.

As those of you who were here will remember, he said he was not versed in the contemporary or even recent happenings in terrorism and he dealt with the timeframe previously mentioned.

Dr. Billington's testimony was of great depth and substance, and the subcommittee will spend considerable time digesting the wealth of material contained in his excellent book titled, "Fire in the Minds of Men: Origin of the Revolutionary Faith" published in 1980. He drew most of his testimony from that work. We are indebted to him for his expert testimony.

We continue with the testimony of an expert, Dr. Stefan Possony. Dr. Possony, now a senior fellow emeritus of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, received a Ph. D. in 1935 from the University of Vienna.

He was Professor of International Politics at Georgetown University from 1946 to 1961. In 1961, he joined the staff of the Hoover Institution, where he remained until his retirement in 1978.

Among his many publications, Dr. Possony authored the book, "Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary." Together with Kurt Glaser, he authored "Victims of Politics," published by Columbia University Press in 1979. He also coauthored with L. Francis Bouchey, the book "International Terrorism: The Communist Connection," published in 1978.

For the last 20 years, Dr. Possony has traveled around the world studying international relations with special reference to guerrilla and terrorist operations.

We are much indebted to you, Dr. Possony, for making the long trip here and look forward very much to your testimony. Would you care to make an opening statement, sir?

STATEMENT OF STEFAN T. POSSONY, SENIOR FELLOW (EMERITUS), HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Dr. POSSONY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to talk about the historical antecedents of modern terrorism with particular reference to the strategy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU].

Let me start with two definitions, one is from the Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropaedia, which describes terrorism as the systematic use of terror, bombings, killings, and kidnapings as a means of forcing some political objective.

Distinguished from this is a definition presented by the Malaya Soviet encyclopedia, which describe terrorism as a policy of repressing classes and political enemies by extreme measures.

This means, in plain Russian or English, that capitalist states, and specifically the United States, are terrorists. With that in mind, let me go into some general points on terrorism.

Terrorism is a form of violence which is usually practiced by radical groups as a means of forcing, not just political, but psychological, social ethnic, economic, legal, and military objectives; or else to cause destabilization, disorder, chaos, and physical destruction.

Terrorism employs, similar to war, special types of tactics, such as stealth, in order to surprise human targets: They should not know what hit them.

The main tactics of terrorist attacks consist in abductions, maimings, and killings of people. The essence of conflict is to kill, and the terrorists take this notion very seriously.

However, terrorism cannot be reduced to killings. It involves subsidiary activities which require manpower and finances, such as the collection of intelligence, weapons and ammunition, recruitment and training, transportation, communications, equipments, and cash. In addition, the terrorists need safe houses and hideouts, facilities to forge documents, burglary tools to open locks and safes, and various paraphernalia, such as disguises.

The combat types are supported by technicians and craftsmen, by persons specializing in liaison with national and international fronts, allies, and friends, propagandists infiltrated into the media—in Italy the terrorists even possess informational and press organs—liaison with terrorists in jail, and contacts with lawyers.

The terrorists also require an environment of sympathizers, as Mao Tse-tung pointed out with his simile about the fish which needs water to live. As a rule of thumb, one may assume that a group of 5 killers cannot function for any length of time without 10 to 20 auxiliaries, and 50 to 100 sympathizers.

Terrorism is an overlap phenomenon, with the overlap being of great and growing complexity. It is usually regarded as a political phenomenon, correctly so. But there is significant overlap with academic activities in universities, art, sex behavior, psychiatry, drug-related activities, occultism, crime, organized crime, psychological and guerrilla warfare, and military operations in general.

It is questionable whether the terrorist has a distinct psychological profile, but even if there were intellectual and emotional patterns and regularities, there would be overlap with the profiles of

professional killers, executioners, fanatics, obsessed and psychopathic personalities, and mercenary soldiers.

The terrorist may be acting in an atmosphere of true belief and concern about genuine threats, but there will be overlap with illusions, conditions of paranoia, ecstasy, delirium, alcoholic and other intoxication, lust for blood and revenge, and amok-types of release from tension. Terrorism may be a reaction to poverty, social inequality, discrimination, and oppression, as rationalists would expect the etiology to be; or to vanishing traditions, values, norms, cultures among, and breakdowns in social structures and religious beliefs, as sociologists might assume.

Generally speaking, those various conditions contribute to the terroristic phenomenon, but they are merely prerequisites of actions and deeds. The conditions sine qua non are, first imitation, which is related to model building and is indispensible for recruitment; and second, organization, which presupposes ideological commitment and is linked to the voluntary acceptance of discipline.

To amplify: The model building which leads to imitation requires that the events of terrorism become known through propaganda, agitation, accounts, and rumors; and that the ideology which results in commitment, is presented and accessible. Also, it must be propagated in print, by electronic means, and by indoctrination, and be vivified through personal and agitational contacts. Whatever ideas may be evoked, the crucial point is that ideals and models be identified and related to enmities and to identifiable foes, so that they become objects of ever-growing hatred and contempt.

Propaganda promotes terrorism, and terrorism is propaganda of the deed, as well as propaganda of death.

Propaganda related to terrorism deals with ideals—usually in perverted form—hero worship, intimidation, and devilization. It also includes deception. Stalin talked about the battlefield of conscience which, indeed, could be a devisive arena, if conscience were considered to denote the entire mental complex.

In paraphrase of Clausewitz it could be said that terrorism is the continuation of political feud with other means.

The pseudo-Marxist notion that a revolutionary necessarily is born in a particular class is not plausible, and the specific belief that the revolutionaries are necessarily proletarians is quite in contradiction to what Lenin had to say on the subject. In any event the professional revolutionary is rarely a proletarian. Often he is a déclassé intellectual from the upper middle class. But he could be anything.

It also seems that frequently the revolutionaries, in the true sense of the word, have been intellectuals with a family background of disgruntled aristocrats and rich grandfathers. Naturally revolutionary leaders, too, may arise from any conceivable social background. The background of the masses of followers can be determined only through statistical methods, and good statistics are not available.

It would seem that specific professional groups among the proletarians were historically more active rebels than others, and that the proletariat always included elements which were disinterested and opposed to revolution. A similar situation has existed with

respect to the peasants. Under certain conditions, select ethnic and religious groups may become revolutionary, that is portions of such groups would display the marks of activists.

By and large, modern terrorism is characterized by a membership of upper- or middle-class background and with a strong ideological commitment usually originating in university environments. In the academic society numbers of organizations are functioning which may propel potential recruits to convenient organizational attachments. However, terrorists may also arise from military and paramilitary backgrounds, which condition them to volunteer for special and hazardous duty. Terrorists of this type may lack ideological loyalties and tend to be neutral with respect to class origin. They are attracted by adventure and combat, and they may be driven by fury.

Women have historically participated in terroristic activities, for example, Charlotte Corday who killed Marat, and they are playing a greater role during the present period than before. The mobilization of females as principals of terrorism is surprising and requires more analysis. Are we confronted by something like a mental mutation? I would doubt it. But feminism, changes in female professions, and political activation through propaganda and university attendance, may play a role.

It is to be noted that terrorists of the intellectual type are suicide prone and that women terrorists also appear to show a high incidence of suicide. Female suicides in Castro's entourage have attracted attention—just like in the case of Hitler. Presumably there is a correlation between terrorism and manic-depressive disorders.

Irrespective of the intentions of the terrorists themselves, the phenomenon of modern terrorism overlaps with such events as arms competitions or races, arms limitations, commando-partisan and guerrilla operations, and military operations by proxies and foreign legions. A military strategist may include terrorism into his grand strategy, for example, for missions which are supplementary to nuclear operations, or substitutions for large-scale and nuclear warfare. On their part, the terrorists, unless they are mentally isolated from what is going on around them, tend to decide on their projects in line with given opportunities.

It is, therefore, wise to regard terrorism, whatever the characteristics of particular operations or campaigns, as military enterprises. More precisely: Terrorist operations are of a military type, but they are undertaken in a legal framework which is different from that in which military forces fight. Regular soldiers wage war against a foreign and hostile military force. By contrast, terrorist operations are undertaken by armed men against unarmed persons who usually are not foreigners, who do not know that they are targets, and who become victims of surprise. While politically conscious terrorists aim primarily at liquidating leadership personalities and members of top staffs, as well as medium-rank persons like judges, or else at punishing low-rank personnel like policemen or jailers, military operations are directed against armed forces.

The terrorists and the military may both pursue similar objectives, such as the overthrow of a government, or a system or ruler, or the splitting of a country, or the destabilization of society; they both enforce discipline by punishing deserters and traitors.

The terrorists may pursue a number of objectives which are not practical for the military, such as kidnapings in order to obtain ransom; and obviously, the military are engaged in programs which cannot be duplicated by terrorists.

The objectives of the military and the terrorists also may be mutually supplementary. There are military units which practice terrorist or quasi-terrorist tactics and antiterrorism, for example, commandoes, partisans, scouts, Green Berets, and Al Saika, the regular terror branch of the Syrian Army; as well as outfits executing intelligence penetrations and sabotage.

Regular military and police forces have been known to engage in terrorism, but sometimes they have been employing secret organizations for such purposes. Examples include the Service d'Action Civique [SAC] of General de Gaulle—which he used to suppress military resistance against his Algerian policies—and the Brazilian death squads which were a derivative of the police. The secret Libyan assassination squads seem to be embedded in the army.

Military persons are moved by orders from higher authority, and they may lack ideological motives; in any event, obedience must prime belief. Terroristic units which consist of self-recruited personnel are moved by factors like ideology, personal attachment to self-recruited leaders, and personal motivations, such as revenge and hatred. Naturally, there are nonideological killer types and enforcers who are actuated by psychological and vocational factors and interest in money. Often terrorism is a deregulated and private war.

In a simplified scheme four basic forms of terrorism can be distinguished:

One. Established legal authority may embark on terroristic wars, like the Mongols; or after defeat and hostile occupation the remnants of the legal or regular forces plus civilian volunteers may substitute for the state and continue defense and stimulate resistance through terrorism. Examples: The Spanish guerrillas who rose against Napoleon, and the French Maquis who opposed the Nazi occupants.

Two. Persons and groups who want to usurp power and conquer authority may resort to terrorism. Example: The Viet Cong guerrillas. The Hashishin or assassins of the Middle East, 100 to 800 years ago, were a mixed form in that they were commended by established authority—though not the type of authority which was recognized by the coexisting states. They concentrated on antipersonnel terrorism, largely to eliminate rulers disliked by their leader, and they used systematic assassinations as an exclusive master strategy, successfully persisting in this project for some 200 years.

Three. Persons opposed to authority and motivated by anarchistic ideas may use terrorism—they think they have no other choice. This type of terrorism is usually of a sporadic nature.

Four. Terrorist groups may be recruited and used by a foreign state utilizing terroristic unrest as a concealed form of hostility or aggression.

Moreover, there are groups which engage in private wars, so to speak, like pirates, slavers, robber-knights, brigands, and friends of the poor like Robin Hood, and Vehme avengers.

Terrorism tends to be divided into rightist and leftist forms, with multiple overlaps. It is geared to political and social power struggles; to ethnic struggles—for or against foreign domination or for equal ethnic rights; and to ideological, philosophical, political, or religious issues. It plays a major role in succession of rulers, and in the creation and restructuring of states. The succession of Roman Emperors was usually decided by terroristic action, and so was repeatedly the succession in the Russian State. Parallels can be found in the history of the Persian and the Turkish Empires.

Terrorism also occurs in connection with the establishment of a state. For example in Switzerland, a terrorist like Wilhelm Tell may become the national hero who accomplished the termination of foreign rule. Often states are reshuffled. For example, the U.S.S.R. arose from Imperial Russia. Austria-Hungary was split up, and several new states emerged. All of these processes are related to, or accompanied by terrorism which shows up in larger or smaller doses. Serbian terrorism, supported by Russia against Austria-Hungary, led to World War I.

The doctrine, the purpose, the operational rules, and the actual operations, as well as the identities of the operators and the commanders of terrorism, are concealed as a matter of necessity, chiefly by secrecy and disinformation, as well as by complexity of organization—for example, front and cover organizations, and frequent name changes.

The situation can be visualized by considering the Chinese box as an organization model—one box is within another, which sits within a third box which, in turn, is contained in a fourth box, and so on. Terrorism may be symbolized by the smallest or the core box, and the surrounding larger boxes may stand for ever larger surrounding groups, situations, conditions, and decoys.

If terrorism were an instrument or tool of state power, not a self-driving group, it could be conceived as being under control from one or more of the larger boxes. The observer would have to determine which of the larger boxes provides the propulsion; and whether this propulsion is activated from an ultimate and still larger box. The observer also must confirm whether the core box is not acting against one or more of the larger envelopes but is kept under control.

Once this is clarified, the question arises whether propulsion from above works by command, or passively by tolerance of autonomous terrorist undertakings, or is restricted to provision, and occasional denial, of resources and software assets. The more professional and strategic the terrorist operation is, the more difficult it is to see through the covers and to fool the deceivers.

Modern terror organizations are often linked to political and ideological propaganda outfits, to parties, or quasi-parties. In the structure of Italian terrorism there has functioned a party which is not a party which runs in elections, but a quasi-party which creates political atmosphere. It is called autonomia—autonomy—and from it have sprung the major left terrorist organizations such as the Red Brigades, Lotta Continua, Primea Linea, and others. Poters operaio is another quasi-party which may be out of business.

The various Italian terror-connected organizations, in one way or the other, can all be traced back to the Italian Rockefeller—if I

may use the term—the publisher Gian-Giacomo Feltrinelli, who is now dead. He founded most of those groups, or their ancestors, during the late 1960's and early 1970's.

As those organizations became active, they split, and as they suffered losses, they changed membership. The Red Brigade is now under the fourth generation of leadership, which, so far, remains unidentified. So for as we know, the first capo and inspirator was Feltrinelli, and the second Antonio Negri, a very learned professor, now in jail. It is a very complex picture. Fundamentally, though, it is one total effort, that of the armed party. The German RAF and El Fatah also have gone through four generations, the latter with secondary lines. The RAF displayed recently an anarchist offspring, the Black Block.

As pointed out, terrorism must be executed through military means. Aside from firepower, this involves the systematic collection of intelligence, logistics, communications, training, and planning. All of this calls for professionalism. If the work is done by amateurs, terrorism is a game of chance. This does not mean, however, that it is necessarily ineffective: Chance and accident can be of great help provided the terrorist stands ready to take advantage of it.

If a terrorist can can just hit a target because the target walks by and the terrorist just happens to be there with a pistol, well, that does not make much difference. Only the end result counts. The individual acting initiatively by himself, and on the spur of the moment, plays a crucial role in terrorism.

Tactics are highly variable and technology is constantly being upgraded. There is a premium on inventiveness and on the utilization of ruses.

The historical depth of terrorism goes back to antiquity. God knows whether it goes back to the Stone Age and the Ice Ages. If you look for them, you can find many examples in all epochs.

I hate to use the old cliché of the oldest profession: there are several oldest professions. But terrorism is certainly one of them. Only old terrorism was highly sporadic and local, and it was neither continuous nor ubiquitous.

Its present geographic distribution is global, in the sense that most states—according to estimates about 70—as well as stateless peoples are affected by terrorist and counterterrorist unrest. If you review one country after the other, you will find that quite a number of them have not just one terroristic strain, but several; and in many instances, those operations have been going on for years. Here are 23 examples of countries, in alphabetical order: Armenia, Basquia—or the lands of the Basques—Bengal-Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Kurdistan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Macedonia, Palestine-Isreal, Philippines, Spain, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. To those should be added Russia-Ukraine and China. Libya, and also France and Germany, may be entering this set, bringing the total to 26.

Government forces may use terrorism defensively to repress or prevent violent opposition, or offensively to conquer. Repressive measures, for example, concentration camps are an important form of terrorism.

Also, government forces may regard terrorism as a mere auxiliary weapon, system, or technique, or they may use it as a major strategy.

The Hashishin model has not found many imitations, and there have been differences in the emphasis places by various terrorist groups on assassinations of selected target persons.

It is the essense of conflict that when you fight an enemy, whether that enemy is a nation, a religion, a movement, or a state, its power and threat are necessarily compressed in a leader or a number of leaders. Therefore, by concentrating on such crucial targets conflict may be curtailed. Rather than bombing or burning the cities, invading the country, or chasing the population, it may be sufficient to eliminate the leader(s). In the past, such a project was infeasible. At present, it is conceivable that entire leadership groups may become vulnerable to terroristic operations.

Our discussion is still under the heading of government forces utilizing terrorism. What states are able to engage in terrorism? It is not necessary that to adopt terrorism, a state must be big and rich. On the contrary, small states may be interested in using terrorism because given their limited capabilities, terrorism may multiply their power and influence. Potentially terrorism is a cheap method of aggradizement. Serbia is an early and impressive example. Cuba and Lybia offer recent illustrations. However, democracies are unable to opt for a terrorist strategy.

Government forces have as one of their duties the repression of terrorist action which is directed against their state, and to maintain and reestablish order.

Literature on counterterrorism barely exists. The subject remains a vast area of deliberate and innocent confusion. It is very easy to define the counterterrorist as a terrorist, and such a definition may be correct in some instances. Nevertheless, there are vast differences which must be respected.

The insurrectionary terrorist—the person whom we usually refer to as terrorist—may use assassinations as a part of a vast arsenal which includes military enterprises, strikes, psychological operations, and mass movements of going to the barricades. Or else he may use assassinations and kidnappings as his major weapons.

For the loner, the terroristic attack is usually little more than a spectacular combination of murder and suicide. The loner wants psychological satisfaction and drama, and his ideal is to get the biggest firecracker on the target with the highest symbolism. He is almost impossible to control and to forestall. Yet one must not fall for the trick of exhibiting or feigning a loner when in reality the assassin was linked and organized.

When you read standard American literature on the history of terroristic acts against American Presidents, the assassins are consistently described as nuts and loners. I put it to you that this interpretation is not supported by the record in all instances. It is simplistic to think in absolute terms like "loners" and "conspirators," and then to define "conspiracy" in such a way that it can never be discovered.

The target individuals may be personages of the State, of the army, and of economic life. Also cultural and artistic targets are important from the psychological point of view. Other targets such

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as mass targets, random targets, and demonstrators are not really targets in the sense that a terrorist selects persons of this sort, and shoots them after taking deliberate aim. Such people may be in the way, or they are hit accidentally.

Still, attacks on random targets are important because they make the point that almost everyone is at risk. So whoever you are, you cannot be safe at home or walking down the street. Such a fear is a strong promotor or destablization, psychological terror, or panic. The basic objective of terrorism linked to striking is mental terror followed by paralysis and collapse.

It happens to be a fact that terrorism is more frequently practiced by some ethnic and political groups than by others. Ireland is a classic case. Other instances include the Macedonians, the Levant Arabs, and the Basques, also certain ideological groupings, both on the right and on the left.

The reasons or causes of the variances, and of the dissimilarities in frequencies, are not clear. Research on the subject seems to be taboo.

Often ethnic and political struggles are combined, the diverse factors strengthening one another. For example, in the Irish case a national liberation movement contains elements with Communist or Marxist ties and links. The Basque terrorists are predominantly Communist in coloration.

In other instances, a national veneer may be used to conceal socioideological aspects. For examle, numerous left terror groups in Latin America assert, each of them, a separate national identity. Yet unity, even identity exists behind this sham of name labels. The expression "army of liberation" is being used in the title of most of those outfits, and gives the show away.

The trick is like listing the divisions and regiments of an army by name, number, and location, but failing to identify the army to which those divisions and regiments belong. So, you have an army in state 1, another in state 2, and still another in state 3, each seemingly independent. In reality, they all are parts of the same militant body.

The trick has worked well in Latin America, where the existence of an all-continental army of terrorists directed from Cuba—or so it appears—has escaped attention. Units of this army are deployable and shiftable over long distances, as was demonstrated when such units were moved into Chile, at the end of Allende's regime, and later into Argentina. Subsequently units consisting mainly of Cubans were sent to Angola and Ethiopia, with missions going to South Yemen.

A parallel game is being played in the Middle East, and perhaps in an area comprising France, Central Europe, Italy, and Lybia.

The threat is minimized and often denied by simple though systematic disinformation, which hides the existence, or potential existence, of one large guerrilla force. This guerrilla army just vanishes from sight, together with its infrastructure. It vanishes because the observers see only disjointed small grouplets with changing names and different nationalities, and never realize that they all may be integrated into one force. So the unitary entity remains concealed. This is a new and most effective form of establishing secrecy. Naturally the cohesion of the international terror-

ist army is weaker, and much different than that of a regular army.

The distinctions between terrorist squads, partisans, guerrilla forces, reconnaissance and penetration units, as well as between combat elements and auxiliaries should not be blurred.

One day an army is hidden and does not seem to exist, yet suddenly, it enters from the shadows. This is possible because the infrastructure is a fairly permanent factor. Yet, being invisible, it may escape identification and attack. Its lack of vulnerability is an inverse function of the intelligence procured about the identities and movements of the terrorists.

Confusion also is rampant between terrorists and guerrillas. A group of pistoleros or bombarderos may possess, or not possess, military worth, it is not a guerrilla unit or a partisan detachment. On the other hand, guerrillas and partisans must be expected to resort to terrorism. A person like you, Senator, who has had Southeast Asian experience, knows that the Viet Cong were terrorists in the sense that they used terror as one of their main techniques. They moved into a village and committed acts of frightfulness in order to terrorize the particular population. But their overall strategies and tactics exceeded terrorism, and their organization was that of a large force.

The terrorism of the period since 1960 differs fundamentally from the sporadic terrorism which existed during the 19th century: Differences include the number of terrorists and terroristic episodes; the types of volunteers and their intellectual levels—which have gone up; the training and the facilitation of their operations: logistic, diplomatic and political support, even by such agencies as the U.N.—with only weak objections from the United States.

The terrorists of today have a far more ambitious strategy than their ancestors of yesterday. No longer being sporadic, local, and highly selective, modern terrorism goes after area and mass and crowd-psychological targets instead of point targets; and it is continuous while steadily expanding.

Terrorism has ceased to be random violence. It went beyond the point of propaganda of the deed. It has become a subsidiary of large conflict, and up to a point it must be regarded as a substitute of war. It may be a cheap substitute and it evidently is less devastating. Whether it can effectively substitute for the main functions of war is another matter.

The increase of terrorist strength needs explanations. There may be psychological causes such as pressures, frustrations, loss of meaning, intellectual confusion, hopelessness, and despair; or a perverted libido for power; or aggreesiveness; or an excessive sense of mission.

Or else the growth of terrorism may result from propaganda, indoctrination, recruitment, and various efforts of psychological warfare taking place in arenas like universities where large numbers of susceptible listeners, viewers, and demonstrators constitute an audience which can be mobilized fairly easily. Causes are manifold. The chance for shedding blood may be the recruiter No. 1.

The auxiliaries are harder to recruit because those are not personally violent. They include the sweethearts and mothers of the terrorist gladiators, political sympathizers, and many "useful

idiots." Basically they help for personal and intellectual political reasons. If terrorism were politically unacceptable, the terrorists would be finished like a fish on land. Hence political acceptability is still another conditio sine qua non of terrorism. It is the fact of acceptability which needs elucidation.

The classical theory of war did not assume that terrorism or guerrilla warfare would ever come to the point of being really significant—the little war did not count in comparison with the big war. Under modern conditions, with nuclear capabilities, the disdain of small wars is no longer realistic, and the classical theory is no longer entirely true. Inevitably, there will be strategists who prefer to wage war through reduced violence and reduced risks. Such strategists would realize that terrorism cannot be a technique of large-area conquest. They would bank instead on terrorism as a strategic technique of destabilization and paralysis. They may hope that after the creation of chaos the target country can be taken over by political conquest, the conquerors either being the terrorists who stayed alive and assumed command, or their sponsors; or an uninvited guest.

Of course, the terrorists require strategic cover. That cover may be provided silently by the mere existence of nuclear weapons; perhaps by large conventional systems; and most effectively by military-technological superiority illuminated by sustained military pressure.

Given advantages in military strength and successes in destabilizing operations, classical battle which decided the outcome of war no longer would be mandatory. If battle did occur, the terrorists may ease the tasks of the regular soldiers.

How did the new situation emerge? During World War II, terrorist forces were largely Nazi oriented. However, the German nazis were more exterminatory and genocidal than terroristic. The Iron Guard of Romania moved under the symbol of Archangel Michael. This concept originated in tsarist Russia when the angelic symbol was related to antisemitic pogroms and to operations against groups formenting the 1905 revolution. The Ustashis of Croatia engaged in terrorism against the Serbs, who reciprocated: just a phase in an age-old ethnic conflict.

When the question came up in the Government of Romania whether the Iron Guard types should be suppressed, Marshal Antonescu called Hitler on the telephone. Hitler told him that he could not stomach the Iron Guard—in other words, they were too murderous even for him.

World War II also saw the emergence of anti-Nazi or leftist guerrillas, largely built up by the U.S.S.R. and Britain, and toward the end of the war, also by the United States. This is an oversimplified summary, in order not to waste time on history. Fundamentally, at the beginning of the conflict the Nazis predominated in regular warfare. At its close, the irregular units were leftists, and they possessed substantial strength.

Today, terrorist groups still are almost exclusively leftist. Rightist groups exist, to be sure, and they are operating, but they are substantially smaller, and far more limited in territorial scope and political impact. For example, in West Germany, the ratio between right and left terrorists is less than 1 to 10. In Italy it is 1 to 10, at

the most 2 to 10. In Turkey, a few years ago, it was roughly 1 to 5, and it was estimated at 1 to 3 when the military took over.

However, rates don't tell the whole story. According to the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution, there were early in 1981, 800 organized neo-Nazi activists, 600 neo-Nazis working in isolation—and about 400 financial backers; and neo-Nazi criminality rose by 10 percent in 1 year to number in 1980 about 1,600 crimes. This included 13 acts of violence like murder, bombings, and arson. Of those crimes three-quarters are attributed neo-Nazis, the rest to other right radicals.

One should keep in mind that there have been fairly frequent "changes of front," meaning individuals move from the left to the right, or vice versa. There was a great deal of interplay between Communist and Nazis before and after World War II.

Before the war, Communists were joining the Nazi party, and some of them rose to high positions. After the war, some of the Nazis—notably Gestapo types—joined the Communists in East Germany. This is one of those "skeleton-in-the-closet" stories which it is unpopular to bring up.

A terrorist is first of all a terrorist. He is violent, he wants to do violence. He loves the blood, the excitement, and the killings. That is his No. 1 desire.

Whether he does this for the left or the right is a secondary question. The priorities are, bloody violence first; ideology or loyalty may come second. The ideology would be very much reduced to monosyllabic basics.

At the present time, the leftist groups appear to be divided by ideological differences. Some of those differences are quite serious, for example, those which touch on the Sino-Soviet split. In general, however, virtually all leftist terrorists regard themselves as Communists and openly proclaim this attachment. The appelation or description is not a label fabricated by the opponents, communism is the term which those terrorists apply to themselves.

They may regard themselves as orthodox Communists or as heterodox Communists, that is, either as members or affiliates of a local CP tied to the Kremlin, or as Communists who disagree with CP policies. Some of the advertised disagreements may be feigned to conceal real agreement.

The Red Brigades oppose certain policies of the Communist Party of Italy. They are not necessarily opposing the Communist Party itself, but officially they are independent. They reject specifically the CPI policy of promoting the "historical compromise" between the Communists and the Christian Democrats. This quaint term may be interpreted as a step by the CPI toward democracy. The CPSU does not like this deviation, but it is disinclined to quarrel openly with the Italian comrades. It is also disinclined to support the Red Brigades openly, who have refrained from extending their terrorism to the CPI. Instead, they eliminated former prime minister Aldo Moro, the chief DC protagonist of the historical compromise.

The followers of Negri espouse "no work" slogans. This crazy idea is believed to help prepare general strikes. It also is used for action slogans to impose work on everybody: if everybody works, work time can be reduced for everybody.

Some comrades are more or less Communist than others, but they all belong to the same family of Communists, with the patriarch sitting in Moscow. So long as the terrorists don't kill members of the orthodox CP's, their thinking may be wildly heterodox, but they have not cut the family ties.

The Trotskyites have been the favorite whipping boys of the orthodox Communists. Nevertheless, Trotskyites organized the ERP in Argentina—that is, the Revolutionary Army of the People—which functioned as the single most effective element in the Argentine terrorism of the late 1970's. The local orthodox Communists and the Castroites collaborated with them fully. There are quite a few Trotskyite organizations which are taking their writ from Leon Trotsky himself, and are very much inclined toward terrorism.

On the other hand, groups linked to Che Guevara or Castro are little more than proxies of the U.S.S.R. But while they are proxies, they also follow their own lights.

The Arab terrorists pose a problem of their own. They share with the Communists some beliefs, and their "socialism" is not more of a facade than the socialism or communism of the Soviets. Yet national ethnic factors are very significant among the Arabs; above everything else there is the religious factor. The religious problem occurs on three levels: One, true-believing Moslem terrorists who don't buy Communist atheism; two, Moslem terrorists who are hostile to Christianity and Judaism; three, Islamic subgroups, especially Sunna and Shia, who are mutually hostile. (For example, Saika-related Shia terrorists and members of the Sunni Moslem brotherhood often kill one another.) Also, Marxist groups who downgrade religion occassionally get into fights with groups who tend toward Moslem fanaticism, Arab Socialists with ambiguous religious beliefs may pose as fervent Moslems. They give themselves away if they attribute the highest authority to the Arab nation. In his "Green Book," Qadhafi acted in this fashion: He is a fanatic but hardly a Moslem fanatic.

The Iranian left, for example, is divided in three main proterrorist and terrorist groups: the Tudeh Party is an orthodox CP, with slight modifications toward Islam and Iranian traditions; the People's Fedaheen and mildly orthodox Communist Moslems and Marxists; the People's Mujahedin are heterodox Communist Marxists with Moslem admixtures. The Tudeh support Khomeini generally, and so do the Fedaheen. The Mujahedin oppose Khomeini and have penetrated the system. (Hence they often are referred to as Monefequin or hypocrites.) All three groups use Islam to conceal their goals. Khomeini and his followers practice terrorism in the name of Islam.

The PLO, on its part, may be divided into a selectively terroristic group, a professed Marxist or Communist group, and radically terroristic Syrian and Iraqi partisans. Palestinian nationalism has second priority after socialism, and the Moslem faith third priority.

It should be observed that the opponents of terrorism, so far, have not succeeded in splitting up the terrorist groups, or to break up intergroup international cooperation of the terrorist. It is not even certain that such action was ever tried.

If today it is not feasible to split the terrorists from one another, one must consider that in case of war, it may be quite impossible

for the non-Communist side to split these terroristic organizations, to split Communists from "Communists," and to split Arab and Moslem terrorists from Communist parties and agencies. During war most leftists may forget their differences and follow the U.S.S.R. National ethnic and right extremist groups hardly will throw in their lot with the Communists but they can be expected to make trouble for the enemies of the U.S.S.R.

Thus, modern terrorism is a factor of the greatest military significance. In this dimension this threat is often overlooked, and people do not want to talk about it.

Another point. The terrorist forces possess a high degree of international mobility which was not the case with guerrillas of the historical type. The guerrilla is a local man, usually a local peasant lead by local intellectuals. But the terrorist may be an international type who travels all over the globe, and is in contact with thoroughly trained and well-informed experts and agents.

There exists a large Communist terroristic force, a Communist terrorist army which includes victorious and defeated elements. As of today, this international army is not yet fully deployed. The evident intent is to achieve full deployment and to emplace terror-capable, well-armed focuses equipped with modern arms and communications, which so the hope goes, would function permanently and ubiquitously.

The terrorist force or army may be slated ultimately to perform as a branch of the military establishment of the U.S.S.R.—not all, but a large portion of it. This potential, or this possibility, is inevitably interwoven with Soviet and anti-Soviet strategies relating to deterrence and initiation of war.

Since such a setup would require practical invulnerability, pragmatists may be skeptical. Still, in democracies, as they are run today, outfits like the Badder-Meinhof group's successor units have shown surprising longevity: In 1979 an attempt was made against Gen. Alexander Haig, and in 1981 Rote Zelle [red cell] still was operating. Also the El-Fatah-PLO outfits, Spain's Grapo, and especially Italy's Red Brigades evidently know how to survive. Defections occur but they are rare.

"Invulnerability" may be an overdrawn term and, certainly, intelligent and aging terrorists tend to quit the terrorist front ultimately. But such groups can indefinitely reconstitute themselves, albeit with complete change of personnel, for as long as the ideology remains persuasive, and enthusiasm and operational skills are being transmitted. As well, for as long as sovereign countries are shielding terrorists, many of the killers survive.

By way of conclusion: How did this phenomenon emerge? Historical, sporadic terrorism is nothing but an ancestor, four or five generations removed. The contemporary offspring is quite different. More recent ancestors existed during World War II. The French were confronted by more or less spontaneous terrorism in Southeast Asia and Algeria, and adopted some of the lessons during the 1950's.

In 1961, the United States failed at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, and acquiesced in the building of the Berlin Wall. A buildup of Cuban proto-terroristic operations followed, and in West Germany, the so-called extra-parliamentary opposition [APO], emerged, together

with university radicalism [SDS] which embarked upon bloodless violence. In 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated by a Marine who had defected to the U.S.S.R., where he maintained contacts with the KGB. In 1965, the United States intervened in Vietnam, operated ineffectively, and became the target of ever-increasing propaganda exposing alleged American injustices and weaknesses.

The Chinese turned to an extremist strategy of rural guerrilla warfare, which Ché Guevara sought to activate unsuccessfully in Latin America. The China strategy, formulated by Lin Piao, failed also.

A new strategy was worked out by Castro and his experts, helped by Gian Giacomo Feltrinelli and Carlos Maringhela, who wrote the textbook on urban guerrilla warfare. This switch was either stimulated or approved by Moscow.

This turn reduced the importance of rural guerrilla warfare, and took into account the potential which was adumbrated in Brazil by urban operations, and in West Germany by SDS, APO, and Spartakus, a militant Communist group. The most dramatic transition to terrorism occurred in West Germany, with East Germany playing the role of midwife—a role which the admirers of Karl Marx love to perform.

Whatever the Communists tried and did, one key to the development is to be found in the glaring deficiencies of U.S. strategy, in American vulnerabilities, and in American defeats.

Weakness attracts hostility. The obverse is also true. As soon as the United States were to become resolute and successful again, it would cease being the foremost target of all those who parade as creative revolutionaries, and who are nothing but destructive disorganizers and destabilizers.

TERRORIST INTERNATIONAL

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Possony. That will be a very substantial addition to our documentation in this study.

Dr. POSSONY. I have a second part.

Senator DENTON. All right, sir, certainly. May we interject some questions at this point?

Dr. POSSONY. Yes, please.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, sir.

As you probably know, sir, one aspect of this study is to determine from knowledgeable people such as yourself whether there is a significant Soviet or Communist influence involved in the international terrorism going on today, and especially what its effect is upon our security.

So that there is no question about where you stand on that particular question, I would ask you to comment, if you wish to, on a statement in your book. I must say that at this point I, as the chairman of this subcommittee, agree with what you say here. I would like for you to reaffirm it because it seems that some of the quotations come from contexts which mystify me. So, I will start with this question.

The book is one written by you called, "International Terrorism: The Communist Connection," written by you and L. Francis Bouchey.

You are referring to the terrorist panorama in this chapter and you say, "They are certainly cooperating with one another more and more, as if they constituted a Terrorist International, controlled and directed by some central authority." In italics you say, "This study does not make that claim because the facts do not warrant that conclusion," namely that there is a Terrorist International, controlled and directed by some central authority.

For the record I would like to say that, having read some of your writings and a number of others, when I began this hearing I believed that; and yet, the principal news item the day after the first hearing was that I was unable to prove that such a Terrorist International, directly controlled and directed existed—which mystifies me because I knew for openers that that was not the case.

You go on to say—and this I also agree with—"But it does recognizes"—your book, your study—"and will show that a significant degree of coordination of terrorist activities does exist and that it is mainly Communists who are doing the coordinating."

"Put differently"—you go on—"If Communist governments and political groupings of one ideological emphasis or another were to cease terrorist activity and assistance, the present wave of international terrorism would be squashed."

Do you still feel that way, Dr. Possony?

Dr. POSSONY. Senator, my second part will deal exclusively with this interrelationship between communism and terrorism.

Let me just say this, the word "The International" or "An International" is a misleading term in connection with terrorism. The comparison with what happened under Marx, or what happened under the Second International, or even under Lenin's Third International, and the current terroristic complex would be wrong. The correct question is, whether or not the Soviets, that is the Kremlin, are engaged directly and/or indirectly in terrorism.

The answer to that question is, yes. I will later develop that further. The answer does not imply the assumption, or the assertion, that all Communist governments are necessarily involved in terrorism. Perhaps all of them have at some time or other carried out terrorist actions. But I do not believe—and I do not think anybody would believe—that as of today the Poles—party or state—are engaged in terrorism. For the time being they are playing a new game.

There are several governments in the Communist camp which are devoted to terrorism and practice it; and others which are not. We should make the distinction.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir. You have no reason to change your opinion regarding the quotation I made from your book?

Dr. POSSONY. Well, I do not really have the quotation too well in mind, but I remember the whole discussion was whether or not the terrorist phenomenon can be explained by exclusively putting it on Soviet shoulders. I do not believe it can so be explained, exclusively. The point obviously is that the Soviets play a major role in this business. But they don't exercise a monopoly.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir. I think that is the "news" point. It is certainly the publicly consciousness which, unless it is raised to recognize that point, will not permit the leadership to take any steps which might preclude injury to our security by virtue of

ignorance of this point. So, I do hope that when witnesses testify to that aspect, that it is so reported.

I acknowledged yesterday that I was quite surprised to learn as I went into this, the degree of Soviet involvement, and also mentioned a point about the IRA which has been quoted both in the New York and Washington papers. I would like to, assuming the goodwill of those who are reporting and asking them not to presume that I have any ill will, I would like to have that point more clearly made in the newspapers if possible.

I was indeed surprised to be convinced, as I pursued this, that the IRA has been infiltrated—the Provisional IRA and the IRA—to the degree that they have, by Communist influence.

There have been a number of witnesses, not just one, who have indicated that. You in your book on page 35 say things which I agree with. The first point, that,

> Terrorism in Ireland has deep, historic roots involving a struggle between Protestants and Catholics; a correlary struggle between Irish Nationalists and the British, and reflecting a long history of British overlordship. The trouble originated during the reign of Elizabeth I, and predates the Communists by some 300 years.

I will pause now, with that quote and make the comment that that was really all I knew about the problem in Ireland until I began this study. Then I started learning things like the following quotation from you:

> The Irish Republican Army can trace its immediate history to World War I, when its cause was unsuccessfully supported by the Germans against Britain. The Communists had nothing to do with this prehistory. However, the official IRA now regards itself as Marxist, and the Provisional IRA, which is mainly responsible for the terror, is Catholic but also inspired by Maoist thinking. Thus, communism has been exercising a strong ideological impact upon a national religious struggle of very ancient vintage.

You go on,

> The Irish terrorists obtain part of their funds from blackmail and expropriations within Ireland and Ulster. They also are obtaining considerable amounts from Irish groups and individuals living in the United States.

I only read this last night, incidentally.

> It is reported that some of their weapons are procured by American arms merchants. However, most of their weapons originate in Czechoslovakia and quite a few in Libya, which initially secured the equipment from the Soviet Bloc. The Soviets doubtless hope to see Great Britain, a NATO ally, neutralized as a potential adversary as a result of the continuing Ulster impasse. Murders and other terrorist acts of several Protestant groups are a major feature and should be kept in mind in any consideration of the Irish situation. However, the Protestants have received no known Soviet aid.

Then you mention some of the Protestant terrorist groups. Then you go on about Communist assistance to the IRA.

You say, "Communist assistance to the IRA Provos has taken various forms. We have already noted that in 1971" and this was also noted in Claire Sterling's and in other books—

> Dutch authorities confiscated a shipment of arms bound from Czechoslovakia to Ireland. In the late 1960's, some IRA guerrillas were trained at Marxist PFLP camps located in Jordan, a fact indicative of IRA links with international terrorist groups. The links are numerous.

You go on to mention a conference of representatives of guerrilla groups in Dublin in May 1972, at which time the PFLP was said to have offered the diplomatic cover of an Arab nation to run arms into Ireland. Then you mention a London Telegraph story.

I would like to quote in this context from Bishop—I cannot pronounce the name very well—Dr. Cathal Daily, Roman Catholic Bishop of Ardach of Clon MacNois, who said in Belfast on November 26, 1974,

> There is no historical continuity whatever between the present, largely faceless, leaders of the self-styled Republican Movement and their honorable forebears. There is no moral continuity between their methods and those of an earlier struggle for independence. One of the aims of the present Republican Movement is to overthrow the very institution of democracy which earlier Republicans sacrificed life and limb to establish.

I could quote from a August 30, 1979, U.S. State Department statement which condemns absolutely and in the strongest terms,

> Any and all support, whether it be direct or indirect, for the Irish Republican Army or any other organizations which pursue their aims through terrorist activity.

This was in connection with the assassination of Lord Mountbatten.

I could quote about 30 sources here at this desk about the infiltration and influence of the Communists in the IRA movement. This is not to say that I do not sympathize with the original cause. I am simply deriving my opinions from what I consider to be authoritative and objective information.

Would you have any comment to make regarding the IRA and the influence of Communists in it?

Dr. POSSONY. Senator, I have not recently made a study on Ireland, so, please keep in mind that I have to improvise a little.

Several things occur to me. First of all, Ireland is a case of a permanent terroristic war or revolution going back to the times of Elizabeth I and Philip II of Spain, and to the Napoleonic period. Second, in the course of this protracted effort, they have been playing games of getting support from the French, from the Americans, from the Germans, and from God knows who. Third, the Communists always, as a matter of principle, try to exploit any grievance, tension, conflict, violence—they fish in every water. Undoubtedly, there are genuine Communists among the Irish, but are there many, or are they merely the loudest and perhaps the most active?

During mid-1930 the Moslem Palestinian guerrillas or terrorists under the Mufti of Jerusalem got help—money and weapons—from the British, the German Nazis, the Italian Fascists, and—please note this—the Communists in the U.S.S.R. Obviously, those extraordinarily skillful Palestinians would have been hard put to choose or follow one or any foreign line. They had no option but their own. The Irish Communists are dedicated to Communist goals, but most Irish nationals are not. Unfortunately, churches have been ineffective in this cauldron.

Part of the Irish historical framework is to consider as an ally anybody, however, sinful or however saintly he might be, who provides them with help. They have been maintaining this particular habit through the entire period. During World War I and subsequently, there were connections between the Irish and Latin Americans, and the Germans were organizing the Communist Party of Mexico, with the help of the Irish—plus one Asian Indian. At that point one gets crazy figuring out who is who in this

political warfare racket. It is impossible to find the true link and perferred beliefs do not indicate the real affiliations.

Therefore, as a matter of principle, if there are reports that Irish revolutionaries or terrorists are obtaining weapons from behind the Iron Curtain, I would ask, "Of course, what else do you expect?" If the next sentence says, "They also obtained quite a bit from Libya and the United States," the answer would be again: "Of course, what else do you expect? That is exactly what they would be doing."

Senator DENTON. Sir, may I ask you again, you say in your book, and I am reading it only as a reference, you say, "However, most of their weapons originated in Czechoslovakia, and quite a few in Libya."

So, to say that they are coming equitably from all places counterdicts this statement.

Dr. POSSONY. Well, the book was written about 4 or 5 years ago and reflected the latest news of that time. I am not sure that today I would say most. I do not have the most recent evidence. At one particular point a ship was intercepted pointing to Libya. Recently, the Neue Zuericher Zeitung, the best informed and most reliable continental newspaper, carried a story of a few lines, and a photograph of weapons smuggled from the United States. Also recently, Qadhafi evinced a continuing interest in supplying the Irish. Is Czechoslovakia still in the business? Which ships carry the weapons under which flag? I do not know. The British apparently did not stop this traffic.

Is there a Marxist connection? The word Marxist is a catch-word. One really must check exactly what is meant in each particular case. In the Catholic context of Ireland one should keep in mind that a number of Catholic priests or, let us say, theoreticians, have become interested in Marxism. Some clergymen are playing a very amateurish game.

You can trace this back to Rome. A few years ago the big bookstore opposite the Vatican—the premier bookstore of the Catholic world—displayed a lot of Marxist literature, more on Marxism and revolution by Marxist writers, than on theology by Christian authors.

Why should they peddle that literature in a Catholic bookstore? I could not understand this. The manager of the bookstore told me, "We are supposed to study atheism and therefore we have to study Marxism." There is no point in dissecting this confusion.

If the Irish do one thing, they also do other things. Hence, unless there is more information, and unless Irish Communists are involved, the help they take from Marxist sources should be regarded as an expedient.

No doubt, there is a strong admixture of Marxism-Leninism. The provisional arm of the IRA, and elements of the IRA itself may be serving the world revolution rather than the Irish nation. It is hard to explain their extremism and fanatism on any other ground.

Senator DENTON. All right, sir. I thought the official arm self-proclaimed their Marxism. There is a spokesman named Ruairi O'Bradeigh, an IRA man of 30-years standing and president of their political arm, the Sinn Fein.

He says,

> We do not want a confederation of the South with the North, nor do we want an independent Ulster. We want a general dismantling of the existing establishments in the Irish Republic and Ulster both.

He goes on to say, we want a Democratic Socialist Republic with a capital D, S, and R; third-worldish, a bit like Allende's Chile; flavored with thoughts from Col. Qadhafi's Green Book. "Similar to communism but not exactly like it. Marxist in analysis" if not necessarily in practice, designed to, "Nationalize industries, control the means of production and distribution, and take over agriculture under state-run cooperatives." Not German Social Democracy, and not quite a dictatorship of the Proletariat either, but almost. The Stalinist model of democratic centralism was not desirable, "but we could not risk having parties around who want to bring colonialism back, there would have to be a reckoning with them."

If I am being mislead as I read these statements, the one in your book—and you say things have changed perhaps since that time—I want to be reled. I hve no propensity to dislike the Irish, nor the Catholics, of whom I happen to be one.

Dr. POSSONY. I am not Irish, but I am Catholic.

Senator DENTON. I would rather believe that the Irish movement there is totally what I thought it was formerly. I have come to believe that it is, to say the least, adulterated by Marxist and Mao's influence. If that is incorrect, I need to be corrected because I would be much more comfortable in the latter belief.

Dr. POSSONY. Without reacting specifically, I would think that one must make an extensive study not only on Ireland but also on the related Catholic areas which have a history of terrorism. That includes Spain and Italy, Flanders, the Basque area, and offshoots in Latin America.

The Italians and the Spaniards took to Bakunin-type of anarchism during the last century, and this particular propensity still remains. Interrelationship between Spanish, Italian, and to a lower degree French and the Irish revolutionaries have existed historically. Unfortunately, I have not seen an explicit analysis of this link, and I do not think I can improvise on it. It is a troublesome question how it happened that one segment of the Red Brigades did not hail from the CPI but from a Catholic university and from the Catholic youth movement.

Senator DENTON. All right, sir. At the time you wrote the book, you did believe what I quoted, but now you think things may have changed since you wrote the book 5 years ago, and you believe a study further would be required to determine the present state of affairs. I acknowledge that.

Dr. POSSONY. Much has changed, one has to bring it up to date.

Senator DENTON. Well, your book was published 3 years ago, and the statement from Ruairi O'Bradeigh was September 13, 1979. So, we will continue to track that. I have no indications to indicate a change yet, but I am thirsty for sources that will tell me that they are different from those times.

Would you like to resume your statement? I hope there will be some time for questions because we have a number.

Mr. FRANCIS. Can we take a 5-minute break? He would like to take a 5-minute break.

Senator DENTON. Yes. I understand that the next part of your statement will deal with Soviet involvement with terrorism.

Dr. POSSONY. Communism and terrorism.

Senator DENTON. Yes, communism with terrorism.

We will take a 5-minute recess and reconvene at 11:30.

[Whereupon, a short recess was taken.]

Senator DENTON. The hearing will resume, and I would like to say before resuming that I believe that this series of hearings so far has become bipartisan. My Democratic colleagues have said things to me and to the press which indicate that they trust my objectivity and I trust theirs.

My second goal would be that in terms of the media we share a communality of objectivity and trust, and I have not lost mine in the media.

Indeed, I repeat that I think the hope for this country lies in the objectivity of the media. They determine the consensus to a large degree, much more so than political figures, and thus I ask for their assistance in guiding me in what they might see as a more objective approach, or a more productive approach in these hearings any time they have any suggestions.

Dr. Possony, would you care to resume your statement?

Dr. POSSONY. Thank you very much, Senator.

Let me start out by reference to the article in the New York Times which was referring to the "former doctrine" of the Soviet Communists.

It is quite true that the Communists or the Kremlinites, want to make sure we understand that they have but one single doctrine in which everybody believes.

It is also true that the doctrine really has never been formulated, except by Americans like Nathan Leites and myself, and several younger colleagues. We have been working on that doctrine to find out what these people are really doing, and what they think they are doing. We started with this effort in the United States shortly after the war. As years rolled by, it was increasingly assumed that there is a formal and fixed doctrine. I do not think that such an assumption is correct.

I do not imply the Soviets lack a doctrine. I assert that it is not formal and unalterable, let alone immutable, it is subject to change, and it has been changing. The doctrine is flexible and allows multiple reinterpretations.

To illustrate, Rosa Luxemburg emphasized the role of spontaneity in revolution. Lenin opposed her argument, and Stalin insisted on party leadership, that is, he argued for command by the Politbureau and the Secretary General. The party achieved precedence over the class. Marcuse enlarged the concept of the Proletariat by including the elements with psychological difficulties.

In 1971 Boris Ponomarev published a piece which, in the judgment of John Barron, Brian Crozier, and Claire Sterling amounted to a change in policy. He explained the motley composition of the new left—which even included Maoists and Trotskyites—yet their "overall anti-imperialist direction is obvious." Hence to neglect them, although many are "clearly contaminated by anti-Communist prejudices" would "weaken the anti-Imperialist struggle." Therefore the Communist Party is "ready to lead the struggle for

the total political power of the working class." A few words from the Marxist-Leninist lexicon suffice to switch from political rejection to espousal, and vice versa.

The modern origins of modern communism are found in the period of the French Revolution. They were alluded to by Mr. Billington, in particular names like Robespierre, Babeuf, and Buonarotti. Blanqui was mentioned for a later time. The so-called secret societies which operated under the reign of French King Louis Philippe—1830-48—are the specific initiators of modern communism and of terrorism.

The lineage starts in 1795 with Francois-Noel Babeuf's so-called conspiracy for equality. Philippe Buonarotti was a participant and after a break of several years continued the revolutionary labor through various secret organizations in Italy and France. The chain of secret societies in France began with la Charbonnerie whose successors, after 1830 repeatedly attempted to kill King Louis Philippe. Workers' associations began to use force, and, in 1831 staged the first proletarian "revolution" in Lyons. Around 1840, social theoreticians were writing about topics which later became absorbed in modern communism. In particular, the term "communism" arose in the secret societies between 1834 and 1839, started its public career as a perjorative term, and turned into a positive term between 1840 and 1842 in the writings of Etienne Cabet and Wilhelm Weitling—and outside observer Lorenz von Stein.

The word "socialism" is about 10 years older—disregarding much older etymological origins. It was used during 1831 in theological writings by Alexandre Vinet, and was introduced into the left vocabulary by Pierre Leroux in 1832, who made the word popular during 1834. It was turned into a general political term by left Catholics F. R. Lamennais in 1834 and Alphonse de Lamartine in 1835, and by political scientist Louis Reybaud, 1836-38, who described the St. Simonians, Fourier, and Owen as "Socialists."

In other words, "socialism" had not links to conspiratorial groups, but related to new approaches in economics. "Communism," however, emerged from the conspiratorial tradition—first appearance in 1897 etymological roots in 16th century Spain—and referred to equality in form of common property through abolition of private poperty. It aimed at the most radical transformation of economic structure that was conceivable at the time.[1]

By 1839, when Buonarotti was dead and the chief secret group, La Société des Saisons had undergone several mutations, still another futile revolt was staged and failed. A group consisting mainly of Germans, the League of the Just—Bund der Gerechten—which was affiliated with the Saisons group, rejected the leadership of Barbès and Blanqui, and moved to London.

In England the Bund partially reorganized itself as an international propaganda society which also had settled in Britain. The traditional conspiratorial techniques were not abandoned, but it was sensed that they were not very promising. The 1844 revolt of

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[1] The history of the two terms was elucidated by Hans Müller, "Ursprung and Geschichte des Wortes 'Sozialismus' and seine Verwandten," Hannover, Dietz, 1967. The history of this terminology can be traced to Cicero, and to the early 18th century, especially in Italy. Modern meanings emerged after the Babeuf episode. The term "terror" and variations of it are easily traced to Cicero, Livius, Caesar, et al.

the Silesian weavers, the first proletarian rising in Germany, was not produced by conspiracy but emerged from "class struggle," for example allegedly mutually contrary interests between entrepreneurs and workers.

By 1846, Marx and Engels came in contact with the Bund. They had espoused Karl Grün's "scientific socialism" and argued against utopianism and conspiracy. They also explained the need to participate consciously in the "historic process"—for example the growth of industry and education, and the rise of the proletariat. They envisaged, as a new technique, to organize the class struggle in relation to production. Engels proposed "no means * * * other than a democratic revolution by force," for example a revolution by the majority, and Marx was thinking about "permanent revolution." Whatever that meant, it was removed from terrorism which at that time was mainly directed at rulers, that is at individuals, while both classes and masses were ignored.

A Communist committee was formed in 1846 at Brussels during the summer of 1847, possibly by Marx himself. The League of the Just transformed itself into the Bund der Kommunisten, and Marx and Engels were invited to join this illegal society for the propagation of the ideas of communism.

Marx and Engels agreed conditionally. In the 1938 words of David Ryazanov, director of the Marx-Engels Institute at Moscow,

> Marx opposed the old, conspiratorial form of the movement, the organization of plots, apart from the masses . . . The task was to organize mass propaganda of the ideas of scientific communism . . . and thus to prepare the proletariat for independent action, for the winning of power.

The Bund accepted those conditions, and endorsed "revolutionary democracy," charging itself with combining legal and illegal work. In 1872, Marx and Engels, in a new preface to the "Communist Manifesto," concluded that the new principles of 1847 had been confirmed.

The semantic habits of the time included the term "terror", which was derived from La Terreur of the French Revolution. This terror was executed by massacres—for example les noyades or mass drownings—and especially by the guillotine.

The words "terrorism" and "terrorists" were known since 1795, but after the end of the Jacobins they were applied mainly to "attentats". (This word is a variation of the English word to "attemptate", 1622 and 1721).

During the 1840's, attentats were a topic of public interest. Since attentats require secrecy which in turn calls for conspiracy, the rejection of conspiracy implied the rejection of attentats. It is also implied the rejection of secret societies.

By contrast, the insistence by Marx and Engles on mass propaganda, on struggle of, by, and for the proletarian class, on production and economic problems, on historical processes, and on a scientific approach to the problems of socialism, eliminated attentats as a major technique.

However, the two prophets insisted on Gewalt—or force and violence. Although this could involve assassinations of rulers, the semantic custom related this term to barricades, street fighting, and the pitting of proletarians and "democratic" armed forces—such as civil guards—against the army. No doubt, a Red Wilhelm

Tell would have been acclaimed by Marx and Engels. But his deed would have been regarded as significant only in connection with politics, not with the social revolution.

To sum this up:

Der Bund der Kommunisten asked Marx to write a program for them. He agreed to do this if conspiracy were excluded, which meant that Weitling and H. Kriege, a German populist, were overruled.

The Bund accepted this condition, and Marx and Engels joined.

They did one think more: By writing the "program," they also endorsed "communism" and its ramifications. Marx often used "communism" as a synonym of "socialism." No doubt, he knew about the radicalism ascribed to Communists, which included conspiracy and attentats. But he accepted the more radical label because he regarded the abolition of property and consequently ipso facto, of the classes, as the most radical solution imaginable.

This compromise between the Bund and Marx was the origin of the "Communist Manifesto"—early 1848—which in fact did not proclaim conspiracy and did not mention terrorism, neither in the sense of La Terreur, nor in that of attentats. The "Communist Manifesto" contains blood-curling passages, but it did not propose a terroristic road to revolution. The well-known phase: "The Communists disdain to conceal their intentions" implied rejection of terrorism. The question of property was described as the basic question (Grundfrage) of the movement and it was to be solved by the proletariat uniting itself and growing into the ruling class.

As usual, practice did not wholly fit theory. The activities of the Communists during the 1848 revolution were conspiratorial in part. Marx tried to correct this, but he was not successful. Nor was he entirely honest, since he also was conspiring. At least once in 1848, he referred to "revolutionary terrorism". Still, his chief efforts were directed to writing, or agitating.

Engels engaged in combat training and participated in desultory fighting. Both soon left Germany and moved to England.

In 1851 Marx, who was by then the de facto leader of Der Bund der Kommunisten, dissolved the organization. The members were not the types he wanted to be associated with. They still were leaning toward conspiracy and were leaning toward terrorism. This does not imply that they actually were terrorists, nor does it imply that they were firmly nonterrorists. They were unreliable and weak in theory. So Marx's best option was to put them out on pasture and terminate the Bund.

As a result, Marx was out of the political business for 12 long years, from 1852 to 1864. He was just writing books, brochures, and articles. The latter were mainly published in New York and dealt mostly with world political matters. His greatest efforts were devoted to writing Das Kapital.

Engels concentrated on military affairs, and studied the practice of insurrections, about which he was becoming skeptical. Neither flirted with terrorism. In a later period, Engels wrote about guerrilla war. He viewed little or people's wars as supplements to, and in case of defeat, substitutes for regular war. He did not think of guerrilla war as a form of terrorism against the enemy or the invader, least of all as terrorism against one's own people. Note

that "people's war", while it can denote guerrilla war, really refers to the levee en masse, that is to conscription and mass resistance.

In 1864, the First International was founded partly for the purpose of helping the Poles who, after an unsuccessful uprising against foreign domination, needed protection against the Russians. Marx played a big role in the International. He wrote to Engels that he did not believe in liberal phraseology, but he did not wish to spoil the game in which the International was engaged; namely to achieve cooperation between left groups opposing economic exploitation and foreign domination. There were friendly contacts with antislavery elements in the United States.

Basically, Marx represented in the International the fundmental concept of "Marxism," if you want to use that word; namely that economic factors, specifically the growth of productive forces and the increase of production, are the key to progress, and that the labor movement must be geared to this insight on an international scale. The Marxists were a minority in the organization which consisted mainly of reform-minded progressives.

In 1871, resulting from the war between Prussia and France, the Paris commune arose to a short, turbulent, and unsuccessful life. In a brochure published after its demise, Marx depicted it as the first Communist State or community in history. The commune was a war phenomenon in which left socialists and nonsocialists, like Georges Clemenceau, were active. The communards practiced terrorism up to a point, for example, they made the Archbishop of Paris a hostage and killed him. No Marxist held a position in the commune. Marx had nothing to do with it, except that we wrote its obituary or eulogy.

Marx praised the commune as much as he could. According to the principle of "de mortuis nihil nisi bene" he described it as a model for the future. The press thought it had discovered the secret wirepuller and the true architect of communism. There was no such man and certainly Marx was not it. But suddenly he was famous and was acclaimed for a role he never played.

In the meantime, the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who engaged in reckles and futile adventures during the war in France, gained access to the First International. Bakunin and Marx had known one another for a long time: Marx considered him to be an intelligent idiot who did not understand economics and knew nothing about the economic conditions of revolution.

When Bakunin came up with wild schemes, Marx thought that he was a wrong member for the First International, and that he was making more trouble than he was worth.

Hence, in 1872, Marx disclosed some of Bakunin's dirty affairs, the most significant of which was his relationship with S. D. Nechayev, the true forerunner of the new left terrorists. Nechayev's story was written up by Dostoyevsky in "The Possessed." Nechayev preached the rule that terrorists and revolutionary organizations must obey orders and that the revolution must be pursued for 24 hours a day during the rest of the revolutionary's life.

How can one be sure that no traitors infiltrated? The only way to protect the secret organization was to have the neophyte pass through an initiation rite during which the candidate must commit a big crime. The logic was that if the member was a murderer and

the organization was holding the proofs, he was prevented from running to the police. Nechayev supposedly practiced this scheme once. He died in jail, a hero of those who viewed revolution as extermination by poison, knife, and rope.

Dostoyevsky brought out that the nihilists wished for martyrdom, and that they hoped for the revolution as an apocalypse, Those are profound insights which ought to be recovered for the benefit of contemporary psychologists.

Marx was very much removed from this mentality, but he knew all about Nechayev's activities. He presumed, probably correctly, that Bakunin was the true author of the "Revolutionary Catechism," where the terrorist scheme was exhibited openly.

Marx argued that this sort of thing cannot be tolerated in the International. Engels moved that the International be transferred to New York, with Adolf Sorge as its Secretary General. (Richard Sorge, Adolf's grandson, later became the Kremlin's top spy in Japan.) A minority of the International split and remained with Bakunin in Europe. By 1874 the International was dead, and both branches were out of business.

Marx fundamentally destroyed the International because it might fall into Bakunin's hands and associate socialism with unworkable and bloody tactics, and with criminality and mysticism.

In the process, Marx delivered a speech in The Hague in which he said that democracy could really be good for the revolutionaries, specifically in England and America, and perhaps also in Holland. Through democracy, the proletariat can organize itself and once it has become the majority class, it should be able to seize power. In other words, force should not be overrated. It may be needed, but not everywhere and always. In any event, terrorists force must be used only rarely and never in a counterproductive manner.

Marx's speech was of fundamental importance and indicated that Marx and Engels, at that time, rejected the terrorist approach and instead favored democratic procedures.

Subsequently, Engels went much farther than Marx and step-by-step discovered countries where revolution through democracy was becoming feasible.

Thus, while neither Marx nor Engels was completely clean with respect to terrorism, they merit a 90-percent rate on being antiterrorist. It is particularly important to realize that interest in, and positive remarks on, terrorism occurred only during the middle phase of the prophets' career. The early phase was antiterrorist. During the last phase when they had learned from experience, they were not only antiterrorist, but also downgraded violence and upgraded electoral opportunities.

With respect to secrecy, the story is more ambiguous. The Bund was conceived as a legal-illegal combination, and Marx and Engels engaged in secret activities though after 1850 or so, they seem to have shunned illegal work. The matter has not been sufficiently investigated.

Writers associated with modern communism have discussed subversive utilization of democratic elections, and fraudulent elections, such as were used in Czechoslovakia to establish the Communist government, have been frequent. But the relevant statements and writings from Marx's and Engels' last phases have been systemati-

cally downgraded and overlooked. No systematic analysis was undertaken. Consequently, most of those who consider themselves to be Marxists are ignorant about the switch toward democracy which Marx and Engels executed.

It also is ignored that old Marx and old Engels were linked to the labor movement, mainly through German social democracy, and that they made no efforts to create a Communist Party. It is exaggerated, to put it mildly, that they brought rationalism to revolution, but they did oppose the irrationalism of Bakunin and of all those who think that destruction and murder are constructive. The recent Italian slogan, "Destruction is Leninism," is of Marxian.

After Bakunin Russian terrorism arose in a non-Marxist form, mainly the so-called populists or Narodniki. Their efforts culminated in the assassination of Alexander II which was discussed by Professor Billington. This was terrorism derived from a motivating doctrine. But this was selective terrorism only against the ruler (or his representatives).

In 1901, the Social Revolutionary Party was founded. It was a party influenced by superficial aspects of Marxism, and devoted to agrarian peasant problems.

It obligated itself to practice terrorism, and for that purpose set up a "combat organization" which operated in deep secrecy. Thus, the S.R. Party had two branches: that of a political party which, after 1905, functioned legally, and that of a terroristic illegal conspiracy through which terrorism was combined with propaganda.

S.R. terrorism was mainly directed against prominent grand dukes and ministers of the interior (that is, premier ministers). Some of their operations were helped along by the Okhrana, the secret police, which thereby thought to protect the tsar. (Nicholas II was, in fact, kept safe till the end of his regime.)

The S.R. run a protracted terrorist campaign, but in comparison with current casualty rates, the toll was quantitatively minimal. Still, the S.R. terrorists accomplished gradual destabilization throughout the Russian empire. This success may be regarded as one of the root causes of why the imperial regime never managed to reform itself.

We turn to Lenin. The first point is that Lenin's brother Alexander Ulyanov was involved during 1885 in preparing an attentat against tsar Alexander III. He was caught with several coconspirators, and was executed in 1887. Lenin was 17 years old at that time and was very much touched by this family tragedy. His conclusion was: "This is not the way to go." Hence, for the first 10 years or so of Lenin's political career, antiterrorism was firm, unbroken, and anchored in Marxist theory and in life experience. For the time being, terror was improper, even taboo.

By the time the social revolutionaries came on the scene, Lenin changed the pitch: in the first number of Iskra, late 1901, he stated that terror should not be rejected on principle. At a certain time, given certain conditions, terror may be suitable and even necessary. Should the S.R., therefore, be supported? Of course not. "The crux of the matter is precisely that at the present time * * * this technique of struggle is untimely and inappropriate." Why? Lenin did not explain. It would have been foolish to compete with the

S.R. and to undermine the line of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, of which Lenin was a member; namely the line of Marx's scientific socialism and of the proletarian economic-propagandistic mass struggle. Lenin noticed that even acquiescence in terrorism might backfire politically, and he steered clear from any involvements.

In 1905, during the first Russian revolution, Lenin changed again and took clearcut positions on guerrilla operations, which he explained and justified in a pamphlet. He strongly favored violent actions in the course of the revolution—that was orthodox in a Marxian sense. His followers carried out a number of expropriations and got hold of money by breaking into post and banking offices. Such operations produced loss of life, mostly of innocent bystanders. Nevertheless, so far as I know, he did not endorse assassinations, and he did not plot the killing of the tsar. Was he not interested, or did he play "coexistence" with the Okhrana? Sooner or later we may learn more about this. Meanwhile the antiassassination record stands.

When the expropriations were backfiring, Lenin stopped them by 1908–1909, and concentrated on theory, propaganda, organizational, and political work.

Thus, while engaging in conspiracy and dirty tricks, Lenin before 1917, had nothing to do with terrorism, sensu strictu, that is, save for the exceptions mentioned. For the first 25 years of his political career, Lenin was not terroristic.

During the revolutionary period of 1917, uprisings occurred between June–July and October–November, and examples of sporadic terrorism can undoubtedly be found. Lenin's fundamental approach remained that of political revolutionary action combined with military and quasi-military operations.

However, as soon as Lenin was in power, by November 1917, terrorism was initiated. On December 20, 1917, the CHEKA was established and systematic large-scale terror was launched. (The abbreviation CHEKA stands for something like Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression of the Counter-Revolution.) Felix Dzerzhinski, Polish aristocrat who became CHEKA chief, stated: "We don't need justice now. We must fight to the utmost. We need a revolutionary sword to destroy all counterrevolutionaries."

Then began a never-ending process of mutual and soon unilateral exterminations which was far removed from Marx's ideas of scientific socialism through production and the rational reordering of property relationships. Whatever the deficiencies of Marx, it is simply not true that the bolshevik communism which Lenin and Dzerzhinski inaugurated in 1917 arose from Marx's heritage. It was Lenin's creation. Who inspired him? Ghengis Khan? Timur? Who else?

The CHEKA is the ancestor of the GPU, and ultimately of what we call today, the KGB. The name changed all the time, but there never was a different baby.

The CHEKA was given a legitimate mission—to defend the new regime. From the beginning it also had an offensive function. That offensive mission was to establish Communist power throughout the whole of what had been known as the Russian empire. Since by December 1917 Communist power was restricted to Moscow, a few

places on the Volga, and Petrograd, this task was enormous, and it was usurpatory because the Lenin regime lacked popular consent.

The civil war which followed lasted through 1922, and in the eastern areas till 1924. The Communists did not seize the U.S.S.R. by revolution, but they captured it militarily, and their military force was decisively augmented by subversion and terrorism.

In this particular war the CHEKA played the key role. In fact, in the beginning the CHEKA and its terror squads were practically the only force Lenin commanded. Gradually he (or rather Trotsky) built up military power, still, the CHEKA always remained the indispensible element, and terrorism was the decisive operation. In the process of killing people, starving them and beating them, entire classes were extirpated and driven out. The extermination of the deposed tsar and his family was an act of gratuitous symbolic terrorism, and was conceived in this sense.

It is therefore extremely surprising that the literature of terrorism rarely mentions the CHEKA as history's most sanguine terror-maker.

The conquest of Russia—or to be exact, of Rossiya which denotes the whole multinational society—has been essentially reduced to the seizure of the Russian core area, and the impact of terrorism on the takeover of the whole continues to be overlooked. In my own work, I made the same mistake.

I repeat: The CHEKA undertaking was the biggest terroristic enterprise of history, up to that point. You can argue, if you want to, that the Mongols did better than the CHEKA. Possibly they did. But they probably did not. At the very least the CHEKA, at that point in time, was clearly the biggest terrorist undertaking in modern epoch. The CHEKA's terrorist enterprise was directed against the population and nations they were charged to defend.

Lenin founded the Communist International by 1920. He insisted that only those foreign Communist parties which obligated themselves to illegal activities were eligible to participate. No definition of "illegal" was agreed upon. True, the direction was toward subversion and terrorism was not then promoted. Yet it was understood that the concrete meaning of the term was variable, and that no type of illegal activity and action was excluded a priori.

How the United Nations got around to voting Lenin to be one of history's great humanists—that is their secret. The CHEKA terror was ordered and conducted by Lenin. If you go through Lenin's works, you will find complaints that the CHEKA did not do well enough and suggestions for activities they should undertake. If Lenin had been opposed to terror, he would have fired Dzerzhinski and reoriented the CHEKA. He did not do so. On the contrary, on March 6, 1922, Lenin threatened threefold terror. He added that if such escalation should become necessary, no worker and no peasant would object: "no one, except hysterical intellectuals."

Lenin did not dabble in sporadic terrorism in select and small areas. Instead, he inaugurated permanent, sustained, and decisive terrorism engulfing the entire area of strategic interest, just as he had conceived of protracted and global subversion.

These two techniques of "struggle" are mutually interdependent. (For example, terrorism can function only, if internal security

organs are infiltrated, and are subverted to a point where they are unable or unwilling to do their job.)[1]

Furthermore, Lenin adopted the basic rule that the Communists must master all weapons and struggle techniques. This principle was made explicit during 1922, in a book rejecting left radicalism! It did not mean that all weapons and techniques must be used all the time but that combinations should be selected realistically, and as a matter of proper timing and expediency, while the temptation of "left radicalism" must be resisted. So what is moderation?

The "all-weapons" rule invalidates the notion frequent in Western literature that Lenin unequivocally ruled out terrorism. He ruled out nothing—he was too effective a strategist for such nonsense. In "What is to be done?" (1902) Lenin wrote: "We never rejected terror on principle, and we can't reject it. It is a form of struggle * * * suitable under certain conditions when it might be necessary." Thus, in the very work which started Leninism, he ruled out improper and ineffective tactics, that is, the use of the wrong weapons at the wrong place and the wrong time. Instead, he pressed for preparedness across the entire spectrum of operational options. If the shoe of terrorism fits, Leninists should wear it, according to their doctrine.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the word "terror" was a fashionable expression. For example, a decree of September 1920 dealt with the "Red Terror." Practiced by the Bolsheviks, "Red Terror" was not a thing to be ashamed of. It was a revolutionary job to be done, and it had to be performed without any restrictions, just as the dictatorship was conceived as government without limitations.

In 1920, Leon Trotsky wrote a book "Terrorism and Communism," which in its English language edition carries the subtitle "The defense of terrorism." Trotsky was arguing against Karl Kautsky, who at that time was still considered to be a leading authority on Marxism. Kautsky dismissed terror as wrong.

In his reply Trotsky argued that Kautsky was in error: Communism needs terrorism, or the revolution would fail.

In 1922, Lenin promoted Stalin to be secretary general of the party. It is important to stress that, contrary to the legend that Lenin did not really know who Stalin was, and did not really mean to appoint a monster like that, Lenin knew all about Stalin and his past record as an occasional terrorist.

For example, Stalin ran a large and bloody operation during 1908 in Tiflis, through which a huge amount of money was "expropriated," that is, robbed. This was the biggest expropriation in Bolshevik history. Stalin also was responsible for terrorist operations during the civil war.

Lenin appointed this particular man to the top post in the party, precisely because he knew him to be as ruthless as Lenin knew himself to be.

Lenin's mistake was that he did not anticipate that Stalin would betray him, Lenin, the super boss of the world revolution.

No doubt, during the last 2 years of his life, beginning by fall of 1922, Lenin rejected much of his earlier radicalism. The documentation is ample.

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[1] See Laurence W. Beilenson, "Power through Subversion" Washington, D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1972.

Moreover, Lenin was becoming unhappy about the operations which Dzerzhinski and others were carrying out in the Caucasus, with Stalin's help. Their actions were intentionally terroristic. Lenin recognized some of their monstrosities, but he was too ill to act, and physically too isolated to dismiss and replace anybody.

His final writings, though Stalin was rejected, did not contain a repudiation of the CHEKA, nor of terrorism.

To summarize: Lenin was a terrorist in action, but not so much in theory. Trotsky was a terrorist in theory and practice, with no pangs of conscience; yet he argued against political assassinations. In the end, Trotsky died in Mexico by a terror act ordered by Stalin.

Stalin was a terrorist in practice without shame and inhibitions. Theory did not interest him. Blood did.

Now, to Stalin as ruler, I really don't wish to take your time going over his record. It is quite clear that Stalin wiped out the Mensheviks and the Kulaks; he organized famines in the Ukraine; he purged the Bolsheviks, that is, most of the surviving followers of Lenin were killed on Stalin's orders. It is not generally recognized that Stalin killed the Leninists much more completely than any other group.

This fact remained hidden behind the word "the purges" or the "party purges." The party survived minus the Leninists whom Stalin "liquidated." Thereupon every comrade became transformed into a Leninist.

Stalin purged people like Marshal Tukhachevsky and scores of top ranking officers of the Red army, plus the ranking intelligence officers, the leadership of the Polish Communist Party, thousands of Polish reserve officers, and numerous prominent members of the German Communist Party who had fled from Hitler to live in the house of their friend, Stalin. He set up the gulags which are not a nonterroristic organization for health improvement, but a locale where people die early or are getting killed. He used terrorism against ethnic groups, including the Jews, the Volga Germans, German war prisoners, Chinese, Koreans, and many others. In addition to that, he carried out select murders: S. M. Kirov who was party secretary of Leningrad, Maxim Gorky, Victor Alter, Henryk Ehrlich, Jan Masaryk were murdered for reasons of cheap expediency, and so, and so on.

Actually, it is likely that Stalin killed Lenin and his own wife, Alleluyeva.

Stalin was ending his career by carrying out, once again, purges in the East European satellite countries. He was just about getting ready for another big purge in the CPSU when he died suddenly. Precisely how he "travelled" upstairs or downstairs is none too clear. If he had survived a little longer, say for 3 weeks, half of the Politbureau and untold numbers of Jews would have been dead instead.

I do not think there is much doubt: If anybody wants to check the statistics, Stalin was the biggest assassin in history. People still get very excited about Hitler and rightly so. But it is very important to recognize that Stalin was a much bigger murdered than Hitler. Those who get furious about Hitler should for the same reasons be doubly furious about Stalin.

To assert that the Communists really never resorted to terrorism, let alone practiced it systematically, is nonsense. One cannot substract from Communist history people like Dzershinski and Stalin, even if Lenin were painted mendaciously as a "humanist." Khrushchev and his associates started their careers by murdering Marshal L. P. Beria, the internal security chief. He had it coming and hardly anybody was sorry about his demise. Nevertheless, Beria's liquidation was the major prerequisite of Khrushchev's career; and murder is murder.

Glamis has murdered sleep, and therefore * * * Macbeth shall sleep no more.

However, Khrushchev realized that the terroristic activity, most of it totally unjustifed, had gone too far. The astounding events which Khrushchev related in his famous speech of 1956 constituted terrorism and nothing else, except perhaps insanity.

But even in his disclosures Khrushchev used tricky semantics to hide the truth, after all. The main point got through, despite the camouflage: Stalin was a terrorist murderer.

When the Kremlin did not want to publish the speech, it was leaked to Belgrade and published in Washington.

The confession was without remorse. While the Kremlin reduced the frequency of terrorism, it did not stop its "wet activities," nor was the secret police revamped. "Destalinization" did not go very far, and the upgrading of Lenin hardly meant that henceforth terrorism would be excluded.

By 1960 Khrushchev hit upon a new "Leninist" idea. He discovered the need for "liberation wars" and explained that the liberation wars were a "sacred cause" for the Communist regime.

The only time the word "sacred" appears in the U.S.S.R. is in connection with liberation wars: nothing else is deemed to be sacred.

What precisely is a liberation war? Nothing but Aesopian language for guerrilla and terrorist operations. This does not mean that every so-called liberation war is chiefly terrorist in character. The point is that when the Communists support or engage in what they call a liberation war, terrorism is practiced, and that the scope of international terrorism has been rising. The expression also serves as camouflage for terrorism pure and simple.

Why did Khrushchev suddenly in 1960 fabricate this "new" commitment?

Please look at the historical context.

In 1959, Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba and early in 1960 began to insert himself into the strategic arrangements of the U.S.S.R. He had demonstrated that revolutions need not be made by the "official" CP's, but can be achieved by hetorodox and "partyless" Communist activists. He also showed that a small group of trained and motivated persons may accomplish the conquest of an entire country, provided they receive political and other help.

In 1961, it also was demonstrated that an American intervention against an isolated Communist country could be stopped.

During the same period, there occurred the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. The Vietnamese conflict was in large measure waged by the Viet Cong as a terrorist undertaking. The United States never quite grasped the terrorist aspects of the contest which were crucial, together with subversion, and such black arts

as drug distribution. Obviously, the Viet Cong model is applicable beyond Southeast Asia.

In 1963, the twin assassinations of Presidents Kennedy and Diem initiated the modern terrorist age.

Related with events in Vietnam and the gradual American deployment in Vietnam were Communist operations in India, in the Congo, in Latin America, Guevara's foray into Bolivia, and in the Middle East. It was a vast canvass. In 1965, the Maoists attempted to seize Indonesia. This adventure culminated in an enormous bloodbath of the Indonesian military, who reciprocated against the Communists. Terrorism was employed in order to create a mass revolution. The attempt failed and backfired against the Mao regime.

The background to those events in the formerly "colonial" areas was still more important. In Eastern Europe the Soviet position was weakening, as exemplified by unrest in Hungary and Poland; the Berlin wall to halt mass flight; and the interlude of "humane socialism" in Czechoslovakia. In the Far East, the Chinese were moving out from under Kremlin overlordship. Mao Tse-tung argued that revolutionaries must make revolution. The U.S.S.R. was asserting it was getting stronger than the United States. Since it had nuclear weapons, why weren't they taking on the Americans and the cities of the world, while the Chinese would handle the villages?

Mao was calling the Kremlin's bluff. The Kremlin had to do something, or else it would lose prestige and followers. The strategy of national liberation wars posed only minimal risks. Hence it could help the Kremlin out of its quandary.

In areas where even liberation wars were too risky or not feasible, a baby version of guerrilla war could be used—terrorism.

In 1964, Khrushchev was fired because he lacked the skills to handle the new strategy. The nomenclatura had a better candidate, namely L. I. Brezhnev, who indeed turned out to be a very professional man with exceptional strategic talent.

I will skip analysis of China's strategy of the mid-sixties which extended beyond Southeast Asia and Indonesia, to Western Asia, Africa (Chou En-lai's two trips), Middle East, Europe, and even the United States. We don't know yet where, and to what extent, the Maoists and Stalinists were cooperating or working against one another. The Chinese strategy did not recover from the Indonesian debacle and was abandoned after Lin Piao's death in 1971.

When Brezhnev took over, Castro had grown into something of a field commander for liberation wars. His main operators were trained by the Soviets who directly and indirectly commanded the Direccion General de Intelligencia (DGI). Samuel T. Francis described this development in his "The Soviet Strategy of Terror" (Washington, D.C., 1981). Whether Guevara acted on orders when he traveled to Africa and to North Vietnam in 1965, or was working for a joint guerrilla strategy with China remains unknown. In 1966 he appeared in Bolivia which he hoped to transform into an inaccessible mountain base for the takeover of South America. He failed, not without being helped to perdition by the KGB. His end did not weaken Castro, nor did it alter Castro's strategy, which in part had been conceived by Guevara himself.

This strategy was tied to the Tri-Continental Solidarity Organization, founded shortly before Guevara's death in 1967. There was a difference: Guevara was skeptical about terrorism, Tri-Continental, especially its Cuban element, believed in terrorism, and under the influence of Castro and Feltrinelli upgraded it to a major technique.

Whether Castro got precise instructions from Moscow for the Tri-Continental project we do not know. The evidence suggests that Castro cleared his plans with the Soviets, who probably told him something like this: "Well, officially we do not know anything about your intentions and actions. Do whatever you want to do. Go ahead, but we will be surprised."

The Tri-Continental Solidarity Organization which was trying to coordinate Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans on revolutionary undertakings, was not very successful. It remained strictly a Castro operation. Still, the North Koreans and the Algerians gave some support in training and propaganda—which they hardly would have done contrary to Soviet suggestions. Tri-Cont offered a good camouflage to Soviet wirepullers.

Shortly after Guevara's demise, a new concept was born: urban guerrilla warfare. "Minimanual for Urban Guerrilla," the basic text, was written by Carlos Marighela, a Brazilian and a Moscow trained organizer of the Communist party in Sao Paolo. "Urban guerrillas" is Aesojian language for terrorism.

Marighela allegedly thought that the party had lost its revolutionary élan. He was prominent in Tri-Cont which gave his brochure wide circulation. He was killed in a terror attack in Brazil. His break with the CP might have been feigned.

Note that the concept of urban guerrillas first was adopted by European terrorists and by the Uruguayan Tupamaros, and that it was at variance with Guevara's and Lin Piao's notion about rural guerrilla warfare.

The urban guerrilla concept is due to Castro, Feltrinelli, and Marighela, all slightly left deviationist Marxist-Leninists who were associated with the CP.

The urban guerrilla concept surfaced in 1968. During the same year the Soviets initiated their extensive help to the PLO.

In 1968 we also witnessed the beginnings of the Baader-Meinhof gang. Their first action: arson in a department store in Frankfurt. In 1972, there occurred the massacre by the PLO at the Munich Olympiade. Subsequently the PLO attacked the OPEC oil ministers at Vienna. One of the important aspects of this operation was that the attack was carried out by Germans and Middle Eastern Communists and was led by the famous "Carlos", a Venezuelan CP member and an alumnus of terroristic training in the U.S.S.R.

The turbulent events of the 1960's culminated in a decision by the Politbureau of the CPSU to develop international terrorism as a major strategic program. This decision was made known in 1971 by Boris N. Ponomarev in "Communist," the official party organ. I quoted this text before, and I think it is worth repeating.

After stating that the New Left lacked ideological and organizational homogeneity and even included "adventuristic elements" like Maoists and Trotskyites, and others which were "clearly contaminated by anti-Communist prejudices, Ponomarev asserted that

the New Left had assumed an obvious "overall anti-imperialistic direction". This movement could not, therefore, be neglected without weakening the "anti-imperialist struggle" and the "prospect for a united front". Hence the CPSU was "ready to lead the struggle for the total political power of the working class".

By introducing the working class, doctrinal difficulties related to terrorism were deftly sidestepped. Lenin ruled out terrorism when it had no mass basis. Evidently the Kremlin assumed that, as of 10 years ago, a mass basis existed, or could be created through terrorism.

A new policy and, look the doctrine is conserved inviolate.

The announcement was made for the party, and not in the name of the U.S.S.R. (The differentiation between party and state, although constitutionally the party runs the state, was invented by Lenin who wanted the Communist International (Comintern) to be seemingly independent from the Soviet state. Coexistence applies to states, not to the relations between Communist parties and non-Communist parties.)

Ponomarev, the announcer, was (and still is), a candidate member of the Politbureau, and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in charge of the CPSU relations with nonruling Communist parties.

The announcement that the CPSU (and the U.S.S.R.) were supporting left groups engaging in terrorism could not be made in a more formal and authoritative manner.

Its significance should have been recognized by all Western capitals. Alas, no public recognition was forthcoming from any Western government. Nor was official Western—and American—recognition taken of the fact that by amendment of 1977, the Soviet constitution obligates the U.S.S.R. to support national liberation wars.

Naturally, the CPSU continues to define terrorism as "class repression", not as systematic class killings. They also deny that the CPSU system of rule and domination is repressive.

It is probable that Régis Debray, adviser of French President François Mitterand, has information about the relevant decisions in the Kremlin, and their application to Castro and Latin America.

Meanwhile, during 1970, Salvador Allende came to power in Chile. He was a rich Socialist who did not mind collaborating with the Communists. (Incidentally, Monsieur Debray was close to him.) He got into trouble very fast. Guerrillas from Cuba moved in and tried to salvage his regime. This maneuver did not work, on the contrary, it accelerated Allende's overthrow (1973). His militant supporters and the Cubans—who were chiefly Latin Americans who had been indoctrinated and trained in Cuba—fled and redeployed in Argentina, chiefly in Tucuman Province. The fate of Allende has obscured the fact that the Communists were trying a long-distance intervention by guerrilla forces, which failed and ruined their ally. More data on this particular episode are needed.

After regrouping in 1973, terrorism in Chile was suppressed by 1977. The remnants of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria merged with the terrorists in Argentina where mass terrorism engulfed the country between 1974 and 1978. Sporadic terrorism continued for more than 1 year.

Suddenly during 1975–1976 Cuban guerrillas appeared in Angola. The Cubans, of course, had no airplanes to fly to Angola. Nor did they have ships to run a supply line across the Atlantic to Angola. They did not have factories to produce the required weapons and equipments. They did not even have the money to pay their soldiers. How did they get to Angola, where they had no business to attend to?

It is a reasonably simple puzzle. The Cubans got to Angola by Soviet logistics. The Soviets deployed the Cubans to Africa to destroy one group of liberation fighters which the Kremlin did not like, and to support and rescue those liberation fighters the Kremlin controlled.

Three years later, we find the Cubans, under similar circumstances, in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian revolutionaries also were helped by the East Germans. Werner Lamberg, member of the East German Politbureau, died in a helicopter crash in Ethiopia—this may have been an act of anti-Communist terrorism. Lamberg was an expert in African politics and movements. He had learned Ethiopian languages and was advising the Ethiopians on how to run their revolution. He was in charge of East German agitation and was considered the most likely successor to Erich Honeker. There also was terrorism in South Yemen, where Cubans and Germans, and of course, Russians, had taken over the country.

Please note that Communist action in Ethiopia and South Yemen did not help those Africans and Asians to liberate themselves from foreign domination. They were interventions in domestic affairs.

With respect to Afghanistan, this is another case of intervention in domestic affairs. I will restrict myself to reminding you that between 1978 and 1979 Communist rebels killed three Prime Ministers, Daud, Taraki, and Amin, and that the latter was liquidated with the evident participation of Soviet services.

During the past few years, terrorism in Lebanon has been endemic, largely—but not exclusively—due to PLO groups, including Lybians and Syrians. A particularly aggressive PLO group, Al-Asifah, is operating from Damascus, Syria, in Europe—Austria, Germany, and probably France—to block negotiations between Arab elements and Israel. The Asifah leader, Abu Nidal, aims to replace Prime Minister Assad of Syria. Al Asifah or the Storm was an element of El Fatah as early as 1962. Before getting involved in Syria it was affiliated with Iraq. Abu Nidal may now be aiming at Arafat not at Assad. Or he may be continuing as a paladin of Arafat while appearing to be his enemy. Observes who don't shed their naiveté before assessing the PLW ill come to erroneous conclusions.

The terroristic war has recently been extended to Central America, notably to Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, where events have been very bloody; and on a lower level of intensity, to Caribbean islands, including Puerto Rico.

Finally, terrorism in Southeast Asia, Malaysia, black Africa, Turkey, Lebanon, Ireland, Basqueland, and Italy has been continuing without letup. In Iran it is becoming endemic at this moment.

The main conductors, aside from the KGB–GRU, have been Cuba, Castro; Libya, Qadhafi; Syria, Assad; and the PLO, Arafat. The assistants of the Kremlin have been Czechoslovakia and Bul-

garia; also the GDR whose intelligence service under the able Gen. Markus Wolf probably helped the Baader-Meinhof group but seems to have withdrawn for a while. Wolf is the bloc top expert in economic technological espionage which he rates as more lucrative than killings. China and Algeria also reduced their erstwhile commitment to terrorism. They all may reactivate.

Changes in leadership account for changes in operations. The causes of terrorism consequently are neither social, pathology, nor economic anomy, or psychological and mental stress, though those factors play a role. Their essential cause is a leadership decision.

Note that atmosphere is needed as a condition. Let me just point to the atmosphere friendly to terrorism which was built up within and through the U.N.

At this point, we should list the different orientations which make up the worldwide revolutionary movement of left terrorism. About a dozen such orientations can be identified with the understanding that participant members, especially those of leadership ranks and specialists, may move from one group to another, or participate in more than one group simultaneously.

Orthodox CP. Except for special cases, those may avoid mokriye dela—wet jobs—and concentrate on recruiting, training, documentation, logistics, weapon delivery, funding, diplomatic, and political support. Some operations may be directed secretly against policies of local parties—for example, those of the CPI. Countries under orthodox CP rule, like the U.S.S.R., may maintain schools and training camps for international terrorists. The main orthodox groups are Leninists, Stalinists, and admirers of current leaders sometimes called Afghans.

Heterodox CP. Mainly a partial opposition to the CPSU and its alleged strategy of caution; for example, Castro in his early period and the proponents of urban guerrilla warfare. Note that all training camps for combat—recte terrorism—are located in countries under orthodox or heterodox Communist rule plus countries ruled by Moslem Marxists allied with agnostic Communists. The heterodox CP's may be divided into a left wing; for example, Castroites, and a right wing, such as Euro-Communists which recently acquired critical and neo variants. The Euro-Communists of all shadings oppose terrorism, but only weakly so, and they take little or no action against terrorists; for example, by pressing for internal security laws.

Left extremism CP. Although those originate in the CP sometimes with a component of ex-Catholics like in the Red Brigades—they border on anarchism. They don't abandon Marx and they reinterpret him. Marcuse and Negri are theoreticians who have been influencing whole the international movement: Marcuse with his substitution of frustration and criminality for proletariat consciousness, and Negri with his proposals on refusal of work—which can be traced to Paul Lafargue, Marx's Cuban son-in-law—work refusal may lead to a new version of strike strategy.

Asian CP. Mainly latter-day follower of Mao, Lin Piao, and Ho Chi Minh.

CP contra CP. Macedonians from Bulgaria against Yugoslavia and to a lesser degree, Macedonians from Yugoslavia against Bulgaria. Albanians from Albania and Kossovo against Yugoslavia.

Marxist nationalists. Examples: Portions of Basque and Irish terrorists.

Marxists pseudo or phony nationalists. Example: Armenian terrorists based on Armenian SSR.

Marxist-Moslems. Examples: Qadhafi, elements of PLO, and of Turkish groups: Communists Arabs and Moslems Second White creating a fundamentalist Islamic image.

Marxist-Christians. Examples: Perhaps groups in Lebanon. Mostly in Latin American, where the theology of revolution is popular. Some church groups in the West professing select Marxist ideas have been giving financial support to terrorists.

Marxist/magical animists. So far noted only in East Java where terrorism is combined with magic rites. Vodoo-Marxist combinations probably occur in several American regions, and in Africa.

Grupos desconidos—units of unknown orientation. Those appear chiefly in Latin America, and include either Communist and anti-Communist variations.

There may be groups which are non-Communists or even anti-Communist but which for reasons of expediency, deception, or provocation support or stimulate Communist terrorism. This sort of thing has been alleged about the irregular Italian masonic Lodge P–2.

Criminal thiefs, robbers, holdup artists, ransom hunters, abductors, and murderers have been known to hide behind political labels. In many jurisdictions the penalty for political crimes are substantially more lenient than for ordinary crimes. Links between terrorism and the drug trade have been noted, also inter-connections with Maffias.

Trotskyites. Links with foreign terrorists. Main example: the Montoneros of Argentina, perhaps elements of Tuparmaros in Uruguay. Also observed in Mexico and Canada.

Marxist-Socialists. Virtually all Socialist parties include members who are close to communism, either because the local CP is objectionable, or because the Socialists were infiltrated. the left wings of several Socialist parties have been gaining ground and have been pressing for distinctly, Marxist policies. Historically, most Socialists were Social Democrats who in recent decades took the line that they were influenced by many thinkers, of whom Marx was only one. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, for example, can hardly be described as a follower, let alone a connoisseur of Marx. He acknowledged his intellectual debt to Sir Karl Popper. The Social Democrats are opposed to terrorism but they have included hotheads like Friedrich Adler, son of Victor Adler, one of the most meritorious leaders of European socialism before 1914. Friedrich murdered Austrian prime minister Stuergkh in 1916. This did not prevent the Socialists from appointing him secretary of the Second International, after they amnestied him. However, this case was an exception.

It would, therefore, be mistaken to link terrorism to the Social Democrats, even to Socialists with only moderate attachments to democracy. Nevertheless, Socialist governments and parliamentary groups have repeatedly shown themselves reluctant and ineffectual in putting down terrorist activities. Furthermore, some Socialists are clearly anti-Communist, while others are not.

At the present time, the Socialist International has repeatedly taken a position furthering terrorist groups, as distinguished from terrorism, in Asia and Latin America. The Socialist International also likes to oppose the enemies and victim of the terrorists. In such maneuvers, the Socialist parties of Domingo, Grenada, Salvador, and Costa Rica played a major role, especially Costa Rica, which has been maintaining an establishment for the training of international Socialists. Really troublesome, however, was the attitude of Socialist groups from Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Austria which were helped by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the West German SPD. Many of the increasingly astonishing policies of the Socialist International must be attributed to Willy Brandt, its president, and such luminaries as Olaf Palme, Sweden, who defended the Viet Cong, and Bruno Kreisky, who has given to himself the mission of strengthening the international position of PLO. Precisely this braggartism attracted terror attacks by Al-Asifah into Austria.

It is most charitable to assume that the Second International leaders misunderstand the terrorist phenomenon and fail to see the threat it poses to progess, democracy, and peace.

Senator DENTON. In your opinion, to what extent do current official Soviet policy and doctrine endorse, espouse, or expand upon the concepts and theoretical justifications of terrorism developed by pre-Communist thinkers and activists in late 19th century Russia?

Mr. POSSONY. A preliminary answer. On principle, the Communists don't recognize, let alone endorse or espouse pre-Communist left thinkers. St. Simon originated the Socialist economy: you won't hear it from them. Walter Rathenau, a German reform capitalist who invented planning is a unperson.

Victor Considérant who prefigured the Communist manifesto and from whom Marx and Engels were copying, disappeared in the memory hole.

To answer more specifically: The ideas and experiences of pre-Communist thinkers of about 100 years ago do not apply to current conditions. The early terrorists concentrated on killing the Czar, or the top ruler. So did the anarchists in Europe and in U.S.A. This is the sort of idea from which the Soviets shy away. They don't wish to give ideas to their enemies. Note that before their power seizure the Communists steered away from the killings of persons with top rank.

There were exceptions: President Kennedy, in 1963, if Oswald is counted as a linked Communist—which he probably was not; former Argentine President Aramburu in 1970; and the former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978.

It should also be mentioned that in 1948, huge leftist demonstrations were mounted at Bogota, Colombia, against Gen. George Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State. The young Castro was one of the participants. In 1979, Gen. Alexander Haig, then Commander of NATO, was almost killed in an attempt mounted in Germany by Rote Zelle (red cell), third generation unit following the Baader-Meinhof gang, RAF, and the 2d September group. The rule knows exceptions, but for the time being it stands.

Senator DENTON. How much or deeply, in your opinion, do these various groups—and others currently operating—draw on the theoretical and strategic and action doctrine of late 19th century Russian terrorists—either directly or through a post-Leninist filter?

Mr. POSSONY. Large numbers of 19th century socialist classics were published in Europe, many through Tri-Continental outlets. Many of those editions were suggested by Feltrinelli. I don't remember Russian theoreticians on terrorism being rediscovered. There are not many of such writers anyway.

Many minor figures could be played up, but only few names are really significant. Nicholas Ishutin, Bakunin, Nechayev, and P. N. Tkachev (who proposed to kill everyone over 25). The last three were tabooized by Marx and Engels, and I haven't heard that there is Soviet interest in Ishutin. The forerunners could hardly teach anything to a well-trained Leninist-Stalinist. Eugene H. Methvin in "The Rise of Radicalism" (New Rochelle, Arlington House, 1976) documented Lenin's interest in Nechayev and Tkachev. But there was no doctrinal sequel to this interest evinced in a converstion.

If this particular Russian past were to be aggrandized beyond its current status in a few history books, it would be necessary to reevaluate and to extol Bakunin. The likelihood of this to happen is exceedingly small. Nor can Nechayev be upgraded.

The pertinent modern doctrine has been filtered through modern Leninist authors, the most important "filters" being Carlos Marighela and Antonio Negri, temporarily Horst Mahler, and perhaps Herbert Marcuse as an outsider. Also Ho Chi Minh, Mao Tse-tung, and Guevara on guerrilla warfare came out frequently, usually in non-Communist publishing houses. There was a flood of Tri-Continental brochures, also of magazines and weeklies. This literature could be picked up easily in special book stores in Europe, also in United States. I do not know whether such literature was issued in the U.S.S.R., and I don't believe that this was the case. The most voluminous output has existed in Italy, according to my experience. Much came out in Germany and in France. I am sure there is also a large output in Arabic.

The flood of documents and histories for indoctrination was largely due to Feltrinelli. Naturally the Kremlin does not want this material in U.S.S.R. bookstores.

The old Russian doctrines are useful to historians, but useless to operators. Much "revolutionary" theory has been produced which reflects modern condition. So the historical background has merely psychological significance.

The modern theoreticians consider themselves as Marxists and Leninists, and digests and party textbooks would be the main "filter". But their familiarity with the classical authors is limited. The terrorist movement shows only minimal interest in the U.S.S.R., and none in old Russian authors. Anyway, Dostoyevsky would be the most instructive source. The ultra left terrorist Communists do not care about the U.S.S.R. or the CPSU, nor do they worry about the Moscow-oriented CP's which they usually despise. They are, or feign to be, hostile to dictatorship. Please remember—please never forget—that many of the pioneers in terrorism were originally indoctrinated by the orthodox parties.

LENIN'S DOCTRINES

Senator DENTON. How have Lenin's doctrines on such matters—both theoretical and practical—been adapted, modified, and expanded or employed by his Soviet successors?

Mr. POSSONY. The fundamental Lenin doctrine on terrorism is that terror operations must be "mastered" by the CP; that this technique must be employed only in combination with other conflict techniques and only if it contributes to mass actions; and that it must be used only if it is expedient, that is, when terrorism won't backfire. This doctrine remains unchanged. The doctrine on liberation war, as stated by Khrushchev, may be regarded as a modification, an extension and as camouflage. Lenin's successors engage in paractices which emulate, pervert, and rationalize those of Lenin. Since Lenin stopped functioning in March of 1923, 58 years ago, it is inevitable that the pupils must have gone beyond the master. It would require a thick book to answer this question in detail. Personally I think, that the fundamental difference is this: In line with Marx, Lenin tended to react to revolutionary situations, and to hold back when there was no such situation. He did not believe a truly revolutionary situation could be created. In line with Blanqui, latter day Communists are inclined—not always, but occasionally—to create revolutionary situations, and to do so through terror and guerrilla operations.

Senator DENTON. What do you see as the relationship between Leninism and terrorism, as defined and practiced by pre-Leninist thinkers and activist—both Russian and of other nationalities?

Mr. POSSONY. Leaving aside backfire problems, Lenin conceived of revolutionary struggles as requiring many operations in addition to killing. He himself turned to wholesale terror, but he did so only after the seizure of power. Organizing the "proletariat" or—more precisely, organizing the Communists and disorganizing and neutralizing their opponents—was viewed as the most important task by Lenin, together with propaganda, subversion, and a critical moments, mass uprisings, and military operations. In my judgment, he would be very skeptical, and hence very critical, about contemporary terror strategy. The early Russian and non-Russian stategic thinkers and activists are nowhere close to Lenin's strategic grasp. They are graduates from grammar school, nothing more.

Senator DENTON. Once terrorism of any type gets established as a theoretical, practical, and acceptable tactic of political struggle, can its use not easily be expanded to support any type of drive for political power?

Mr. POSSONY. In terms of their intent, a Communist Party would accept a terrorist as a leader only, if he is above all, an experienced, all-around organizer and a political talent. If he is just a killer, he would get a job dealing with killings. Outside the CP context, terrorism may be a method of reading out for political power. Examples: Many Roman emperors, and modern changes of government in black Africa. The Nazis also used terror to get into power. However, modern terrorists are often suicide-prone and disturbed. A terrorist may become a political leader, but on the whole, his chances are poor. The typical terrorist ends as debris of history.

By contrast, an effective political leader may from time to time tolerate or initiate terror acts, and his chances of thereby stengthen

ening his power are quite good. Examples: Stalin and Hitler, and perhaps de Gaulle (if some of the stories about him turn out to be true).

Let there be no doubt about the incompatibility of democracy and terrorism. Terrorism destroys democracy because elections are influenced or decided by fear and terror, and because political power may be seized by force, either by the terrorists or the anti-terrorists.

Senator DENTON. What major differences were there between the kind of revolutionary violence used by nationalist revolutionaries in the 18th and early 19th centuries and the kind of violence both advocated and practiced slightly later by Russian theoreticians and activists?

Mr. POSSONY. Nationalism and revolutionism are very different ideologies, but they can be merged. Their respective struggle and combat techniques overlap, and vary in time. The historical techniques symbolized by the dagger and the pistol, were used by both currents, the Russian terrorists introduced the bomb.

Both Marx and Lenin were sympathetic to nationalism. Marx favored German unification, and Lenin was a conscious cultural Russian. Both acknowledged the legitimacy of national interests of foreign nations. Lenin sought to exploit nationalist revolutionary movements for his purpose, but argued that the class struggle must have precedence of the struggle for self-determination. The meanings of those big terms are very fluid.

The main difference is this: Early evolutionary terrorism was symbolic. Modern revolutionary terrorism either is geared to mass effects or to strategic moves.

As it pertains to terrorism, Communist strategy is not conceived in the comparatively simple and almost exclusively military form expostulated, for example, by the late Marshals Sokolovsky and Grechko, or by Admiral Gorshkov. It is conceived as double strategy—which Western analysts might be well advised to regard as multiple strategy.

The combination of socialism and nationalism, which Lenin promoted, and on which Stalin did his best theoretical work, constitutes perhaps the earliest case of double strategy. Hitler's copy of the combination was the secret of his success.

The fact of double strategy, which the Communists have been using routinely, is widely ignored and sometimes dismissed as an invention by professional anti-Communists. Yet Communists may even use two Communist parties, in one country, as they did in Germany and Cuba.

The purpose of double strategy is to practice contradictory strategies simultaneously, for example, coexistence between states and conflicts between social systems. Disarm the bourgeoisie, and arm the proletariat, was Lenin's prescription for disarmament policy. In this context, terrorism is one of the projects which implements coexistence, that is, it is aimed at weakening and paralyzing resistance to Communist buildup of strength, at acquiring technological and strategic superiority, at facilitating para-military projects and at easing military operations.

Aside from the United States, China, and West Germany, Turkey, is the most important country for the U.S.S.R.: It is a

borderland, it controls the Bosphorus through which most of soviet shipping must pass, and about one-fifth of the soviet population is of Turkish ethnicity, and is growing more rapidly than the other population groups.

The incidence of terrorism was larger in Turkey than anywhere else, and contrary to most other cases, the left terrorists were effectively and brutally attacked for about 2 years by right terrorists. After the military asserted their power in September 1980, they concentrated on searching for weapons. It turned out that rather enormous arsenals had been collected. Those arsenals were so large that neither the leftists nor the rightists could have obtained the weapons in Turkey. Neither had the finances to buy more than a small fraction, even if opium smuggle is taken into consideration.

It is therefore an almost inescapable conclusion that the weapons must have been made available from outside forces. The evidence also suggests that the weapons reached Turkey through Bulgaria and Syria. This means that the weapons would have been made available by the U.S.S.R.

How come? Soviet weapons not only go to the left, but also to the right terrorists? Exactly. If the Soviet aim is to destablize, then mutually terrorist campaigns are infinitely more effective than single campaigns. For example, in Argentina, terrorism was unusually bloody because the Communist terrorists were attacked by rightists terrorists from the Tacuara National Movement which also had volunteered for security duties.

Terrorism in Iran has three components: terrorism organized by the "muftis"; terrorism practiced by groups oriented toward communism and affiliated with the Khomeini regime, including the terrorism that was directed against the United State (hostages); and terrorism organized against the Khomeini regime from the left. (I referred to Iran before.) The two latter categories seem both to be influenced and supported by the KGB–GRU practicing double strategy.

Nothing new. The early division of labor between S.R. and Bolsheviks, though informal and accidental, by which the former practiced terrorism, while the latter abstained from assassinations, constituted a very early de facto double strategy. In 1932, the Kremlin backed the German, CP, and it helped simultaneously the Nazis to take over Germany. Some 30 years later, Hitler and his followers were gone, but the Kremlin supported neo-Nazi youngsters to paint swastikas and desecrate Jewish cemetaries, in order to prove that the Nazis were a continuing threat and that the Bonn government was revivifying nazism.

"Double strategy" is an elementary application of Hegelian dialectics, with two of its aspects being stated clearly, while the third aspect, the synthesis, and specifically its manifestation in the Communist intent, is left unsaid.

So far, the Western media have been unable to handle this concept, and they did not even notice the term although the Communists use it all the time.

The expression, "Double strategy", is actually revealing and provides much clarification of Communist concepts and procedures. Sometimes the Communists produce semantics which are more

easily understandable than our interpretations by which we try to describe and simplify Communist thinking. American mis-assessments of Soviet SALT intentions are due to our unwillingness to take cognizance of double strategy.

The KGB, or the Committee for State Security is the U.S.S.R. Government's arm for secret operations. The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet armed forces, the GRU, also is active in the area of secret operations. The intelligence services of the satellites function as KGB–GRU auxiliaries. Thus, terroristic projects in which the Kremlin is interested can be directed or mediated through KGB and GRU; a formidable apparatus.

The KGB may be concerned with the action itself, its preparations, and tactics; or it may restrict itself to the collection of intelligence; or it may want to insure success or failure, or to forestall an incident and its consequences. GRU probably is chiefly involved in guerrilla and massive operations.

The information about the KGB is by no means complete. But it is ample and suffices for the understanding of the Soviet involvement in terrorism. It usually is not good enough to determine the details of Soviet involvement or noninvolvement in specific deeds or terror campaigns. Such information, however, may appear after a lapse of time. Secrets will out, in the U.S.S.R. as everywhere else.

The public is hardly interested in the details of dozens of incidents. It wants to know whether and how the U.S.S.R. is connected with international terrorism, and whether the U.S.S.R. has been responsible, by and large, for the dramatic growth of this plague within 15 to 20 years.

It is axiomatic that the U.S.S.R. cannot be responsible, all by itself and alone for the entire phenomenon; that some of the responsibility is shared; that some of the operations have been independent; that others were hostible; and that a number of events were spontaneous.

It also is axiomatic that positive evidence for intelligence on top secret activities, which are protected by disinformation and deception, cannot be in the nature of scientific proof. It is necessarily in the nature of legal proof, that is, the case is made beyond reasonable doubt, and the demonstration must dispel doubts about plausibility.

Unlike pleadings before court which usually are concerned with the guilt or innocence of individuals, an intelligence estimate must reflect numerous factors which, to a jurist, would appear to be extraneous or irrelevant, such as correlated strategic and political-behavioral patterns.

Much of the evidence must be circumstantial (which, incidentally, is acceptable in court), and much is to be related to *corpora deliciti* of persons and groups. Furthermore, numerous eye and participant witnesses have been forthcoming and have been submitting information. Some of these witnesses are less trustworthy than others, but overall the testimony has been mutually corroborative.

Finally, the semantics the Soviets employ to refute the accusation that they are participants in terrorism have been revealing: they deny being terrorists on the basis of their specious definitions.

For example, they have asserted that because of its class character and its classlessness the U.S.S.R. can never be an aggressor. The Soviets use expressions like "fight for liberation," or "class struggle," or "partisan action" to denote operations which Americans call terrorism. Put differently, the Soviets have been enabled to conceal through semantics that they are responsible for assassinations, and they have made heroes out of some of their assassins, for example, Ramon Mercader and Bogdan Stashinsky. They just don't describe such comrades as "terrorists". (Note that Stashinsky defected and testified on those procedures.)

The key to the whole problem are the activities of the KGB, not misleading word games. These activities have been chronicled and analyzed in John Barron, "KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents" (New York, Bantam, fourth printing, 1974); and Harry Rositzk, "The KGB, The Eyes of Russia" (New York, Doubleday, 1981). Baron, of Readers Digest, systematically interviewed scores of knowledgeable persons, including defectors, and Rositzke was a CIA analyst, specializing in KGB matters. I also recommend Claire Sterling, "The Terror Network" (New York, Holt, Rinhart and Winston, 1981), especially chapter 16 which discusses the related coverups in the West.

The KGB is engaged on numerous jobs, quite a few ranging worldwide. Some of these are typical of all secret services, such as intelligence collections and counterintelligence. In addition, they discharge domestic functions many of which resemble, in part, those handled by the FBI.

They also discharge tasks which are either unique to them, or are carried out on a larger scale and in greater frequency and intensity than by other states. Illustrative examples are disinformation, and extensive recruitment and training of terrorists selected from students, labor and media people, scientists, businessmen, cultural and artistic types, politicians traveling in the U.S.S.R., and others who were invited to visit. KGB personnel is building abroad front organizations where the potential recruit can be observed and tested. Those foreigners who cooperate may engage in disruption and infiltration as well as in strikes, demonstrations, unrest, and riots, especially riots between mutually unfriendly religious and ethnic groups, for example, Copts and Moslems.

The purpose often is to provoke security forces to open fire, to make martyrs, and to get innocents killed. This is an usually forgotten and sophisticated variant of terrorism.

Undertakings of this type are supported and stimulated, directly or indirectly, by illegal residents who work for the S directorate (S like sugar) of the First Chief Directorate, and are under the control or influence of specialists in the local Soviet Embassy. Those specialists, in turn, are subordinate to functional and geographical directorates at Moscow. This general organizational scheme is applied with numerous variations.

During World War II, the KGB's Fourth Directorate was in charge of sabotage, partisan (guerrilla) actions, and assassinations. On January 1, 1946, a Special Bureau was founded to handle wet and other sensitive jobs. This reorganization was contemporary with Stalin's switch from the war alliance to the cold war. In connection with the Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe and purges

of the local CP's, the Special Bureau was busy, and its handiwork was widely reported at the time. After Stalin's death in 1953, the Bureau was closed and became the 9th section of the First Chief Directorate. In 1959 it was renamed department 13, also under the First Chief Directorate.

In 1969, following Brezhnev's adoption of a new policy, and the emergence of modern international terrorism by a few years, another reorganization in the KBG took place. From this emerged Department V, "as in Victor," wrote John Barron.

Is Department V then the core? Perhaps yes. Perhaps no. Department V has a background of executive actions, and Barron calls it the Executive Action Department. Such actions, while bloody, must not be confused with terrorism as a strategy. Barron did say that Department V has been creating a capability of sabotaging

> * * * foreign public utilities, transportation, and communication facilities, and other nerve centers in peacetime. Its purpose is to give Soviet rulers the option of immobilizing western countries through internal chaos during future international crises.

This sounds plausible. But such a strategy of anticipatory sabotage does not appear to be feasible. There is little evidence showing that such a strategy of sabotage is actually being implemented prior to war. And its feasibility is highly doubtful.

A cover story? Undoubtedly, KGB and GRU are expected to create an option of immobilizing western countries, and unquestionably sabotage will play a role in this mission. But the main task of immobilizing must consist of operations against humans, that is, mass terrorism. For at least as long as the conflict is to be held at low key, and premature or early surrender is aimed at, urban guerrilla operations must remain limited. But they could be shading into conventional war as soon as escalation is decided upon. Still another approach to terrorism would be selected if it were used as a supplement to nuclear attack.

There are anomalies in current public knowledge of the KGB structure:

One, no section seems to have been identified which handles weapons delivery. No such section may be necessary for rail and ship transport; but the clandestine insertion of arms, especially of large arms through smuggle requires acceptance at the border or onshore, followed by concealment and distribution. Extensive staff work, dependable operators, transport facilities, and depots are necessary. Weapons delivery is a large operation, and calls for security, connections, and funds in hard currency. This may be a GRU mission.

Two, KGB and GRU have large numbers of operators in the field. A few countries offer top intelligence targets imposing great workloads on the KGB. In most countries intelligence requirements can be satisfied by few operators, yet many such countries are hosts to large KGB missions. Thus, a substantial part of the KGB "army" has no clearly discernible tasks, and may be deemed to be engaged in revolution or liberation, exclusively or primarily.

It should not be forgotten that Soviet field operators must observe strict security, and must not be exposed. When they are caught in flagranti, their whole mission may be expelled, as hap-

pened in Britain during 1971, in Mexico during the same year, and in Belgium, Bolivia, and Egypt at other times.

Hence, it is operationally imperative for all revolutionary actions to be undertaken mainly by persons of native ethnicity.

Soviet operators, therefore, are able to handle special jobs only. This applies also to helpers from Communist services outside the U.S.S.R., such as Czechoslovakia and Cuba.

Three, if the V Department were in charge of terrorist strategy, the major anomaly would exist that this outfit is not high up in the hierarchy and therefore would lack the real power needed to coordinate the pertinent activities of a number of Directorates, including those within other Chief Directorates and with GRU.

Four, in this connection, a noteworthy anomaly appears. There is the First, Second, and Fifth Chief Directorate and the "unnumbered" Border Guards Directorate. Numbers Three and Four supposedly do not exist. If Border Guards had an informal number, say four, there could be an ultrasecret Chief Directorate, say, Three. This ultrasecret agency could be assigned responsibility for revolution, liberation, and terrorism.

Since large numbers are in the field doing various political warfare jobs, they need a large organization to function. Their bosses must be of exalted rank, and must have plenty of authority.

Five, turn this around: A "department" is at a comparatively low level; a letter sub-department like V is presumably still lower; and there does not seem to be a free spot for another directorate. Logically, all partisan actions—urban and rural guerrilla, and terrorism—if they were given strategic significance, so that target countries would be immobilized during international crises, would have to be run by a chief directorate.

It may be objected, however, that the enterprise is too widespread and diffuse, to be handled from a single command center. Indeed. But the organizational logic expounded here does not imply a single all-embracing command center. With the GRU in the game, at least two centers exist anyway, perhaps with one superordinated supremo or glavnoye kommandushchi.

The top group within the KGB would, to be sure, command its field personnel, and it would influence some of the client groups, with the links remaining concealed. The support which the KGB may be making available secretly to foreign groups, whose members also are kept ignorant about the connection, must be directed through selected recipients and cutouts. The KGB requires a great deal of intelligence on suitable individuals and grouplets, and it must devote attention to recruitment and training.

All this sort of effort may be described as logistics, in a broad interpretation of the term. It could then be stated that the KGB concentrates on logistics, and save for exceptional cases, does not get involved action. Whatever direct or indirect dealings the KGB may have with terror groups are kept secret, and if contacts are necessary, the KGB will try to effect those via cutouts or proxies. In theory, no Russians and no Soviet citizens should appear.

The same reasoning applies to the GRU.

In both KGB and GRU, a senior director is necessarily in charge, and necessarily he reports to the KGB Chairman and to the Minister of Defense, respectively. Those two gentlemen are members of

the Council of Defense which is the highest strategic authority in the U.S.S.R. The existence of the Soviet Oborony was kept secret till 1976.

The SO necessarily exercises the top responsibility for any single commander who may be in charge of terrorism. Such a person probably does not exist—he would have to wear two hats, one of the KGB, the other of the army, which is contrary to Soviet practice.

Hence in all likelihood the SO exercises top command through KGB and military channels.

The SO also must supervise terror operations and take great care not to lose control.

In summary: KGB and GRU have the organization, the personnel, and the capability to mount and to run terror campaigns in many areas of the globe, to observe most of the existing terror groups of various political orientations, and to influence and penetrate many of those, including rightists. No other capability of this type exists anywhere.

The search for a single Soviet command of terrorism is futile. Not because there are no centers, but because there are many; and because this strategic project cannot utilize central command at its core. The international terror enterprise is based on interlocking networks with numerous intersections and focal points, with the flow of decisions moving downward as well as upward and sideways.

There are commentators and analysts who want conclusive evidence. Perhaps they wish to see the complete KGB table of organization, including all ultrasecret units, with their functions explained in detail, and copies of action directives signed by KGB directors or by Andropov himself. Unfortunately, before they grasp the nature of the terror operation, answers to these questions won't be illuminating, and won't bare more than the skeleton while body and brain remain hidden.

Once again in this century, a new type of conflict has made its appearance. Its nature must be deduced from its action behavior.

I believe that the evidence at hand is adequate to support this pragmatic conclusion: If the various governments were to reduce substantially the number of diplomatic accreditations granted to Soviet citizens, the incidence of terror operations against the United States, its allies and friends, would be cut down drastically.

Now, with your permission, Senator, I would like to summarize the case of Mehemet Ali Agca, the man who shot the Pope. I will make a few salient points, then I am through.

Senator DENTON. All right, sir, go ahead.

Dr. POSSONY. Agca has a Turkish passport, but he may be of Armenian descent. It is generally assumed that he is a Moslem. That is probably true, but it is not confirmed.

Agca was in jail for having murdered a liberal Turkish journalist. It was a military jail, and he fled from it. If you were to try that in a normal Turkish military jail, you would find this feat quite impossible. If you break out from a jail, you either had accomplices or you were let out. Who were those accomplices? They had to be Turks, and obviously they must have included Turkish military. If Turkish soldiers set him free without authorization,

there may be traitors or infiltrators in the Turkish military establishment. Those Turks may have been from Turkey or from any number of other states where Turks are living, for example, the U.S.S.R. or Iran.

When Agca got out, he had money and acquired a bank account. If you are a poor young Turk sitting in jail, after paying for the lawyers, you do not have any money left. Yet Agca had money to travel extensively all over Europe, to big cities and to resorts like the Balearic Islands. He had documents—false ones—referring to another name. Most importantly, he had excellent local contacts in several countries. Wherever he went, he knew addresses, and he was helped.

He had indicated his intention to kill the Pope as early as 1979, in a letter to a Turkish newspaper.

What are his ties? There are six possible ties, and additional nebulous connections.

First, the Palestinian organization run by George Habash. Habash is an avowed Communist, and is generally considered to be the main Soviet proxy in the Arab world. On the authority of the Italian magazine L'Espresso, he is also considered as the main organizer of the left terrorists in Turkey. Agca was supposedly observing the Pope during his visit to Turkey. Reportedly he did this job for the Habash group. According to a related story, Agca took a refresher course in Lybia during April 1981.

Second, Agca is supposed to be related to the Turkish nationalist movement. It is not specifically stated that he is connected with the Grey Wolves, but a link with the National Action Party of Col. Alparslan Turkesh is suggested. Since Agca's escape predates the military takeover, this version is possible. But Agca's activities after the change of government in Turkey do not fit this hypothesis well: The National Action Party is in jail, is threatened by death penalties, and has been deprived of its resources. A portion of the Grey Wolves, the youth group of the NAP, remains in liberty, but under the conditions of early 1981 they hardly were interested in Agca or his projects. The tie with the right may have been suggested as a deception. Since, however, there has been much fluctuation between left and right, Agca may have had his feet in both camps.

Third, Agca supposedly had contact with rightist elements in Spain. Those particular rightist elements are of a special type—somewhat similar to the Tacuara—and they are associated with an entity referred to as the Black International. Whether that term is correct, descriptive, or misleading, I do not know. The Turkish followers of Khomeini are described as extreme antisemites. [Slogan: "death to the Jews".] This might be a tie to right extremists in Spain—and Latin America.

There are, in any event, people whom you may describe as dissident and terroristic Catholics. They associate their activities with St. Michael, the Archangel. The movement, if that's what it is, started during 1905 in Russia, where it was referred to as the Black Hundreds. The founder was Vladimir M. Purishkevich, a non-Catholic member of the Duma—the former Russian Congress—and in 1917 one of Rasputin's murderers.

Purishkevich was in contact, by 1920 or so, with the early Nazis who adopted his ideological package, minus the St. Michael aspect.

The St. Michael idea later became explicit among the Iron Guard in Rumania, and from there spread to Catholic countries as an underground movement.

Thus, the international origin of German national socialism centered on Purishkevich who dominated the thinking of the Okhrana; remnants of the Okhrana gave money to the Nazis and were among the early wire pullers of the Hitler movement. The Okhrana must not be confused with the KGB, though there are historical links. The KGB may possess secret ties to the modern St. Michael movement.

So, if Agca was a protégé of a St. Michael group, he might have been indirectly connected with the Soviets. Since St. Michael fanatics have strenuously objected to Vatican policy, he may also have had a concrete motive for his deed. All of this must sound crazy to sober political observers, yet it looks less far fetched to persons familiar with the history of the Nazis and of right European terrorists.

Fourth, Agca had a high caliber pistol, and he got it from or in Bulgaria, a proxy of the U.S.S.R. According to L'Espresso, Bulgaria has been supplying arms to Turkish terrorists. It can be argued that it was not difficult for Agca to pick up a pistol and that the pistol could have easily been of Bulgarian make. Nevertheless, he did have a Bulgarian pistol. It is improbable that he carried that pistol during two dozen or so border crossings, including bloc borders. If he did not bring the pistol from Turkey or Bulgaria, did he get it in Italy? How?

Fifth, Agca may have been acting together with the Armenians. If he is an Armenian, he probably is a Christian, not a Moslem. The Armenians are becoming active and allegedly commited about 130 terrorists acts since 1977. They have been explicitly opposed to the Vatican and to the Pope. They carried out a few operations in connection with the Pope's trip to Turkey: They did not want him to go there. That is a matter of record.

"Secret Armenian Army of Liberation" is a revealing name. This "Army" describes itself as democratic and socialist, which is equally revealing. Elements of this particular army originate from Armenia, that is, the Armenian SSR in the U.S.S.R. The main force is commanded from Beirut.

If Armenian activities are taking place, the KGB, as a matter of defensive obligation, must infiltrate those groups. By the same token, they may have started a few of their own Armenian citizens on the terrorist path. The Justice Commandos, associated with the ancient Dashank party, performs terrorism from the Right.

Sixth, there is rumor that radical Moslem Shiites were sponsoring Mr. Agca. I could not find any corroborative indicators on this. Similarly, I find nothing about his alleged connections with the Kurds, except that the Kurds are participating in nationwide left terrorism in Turkey, and that Marxist Kurds and Armenians have joined forces.

Confronted with a list like that, the good old cui bono test is difficult to apply. No beneficiary becomes visible.

The Soviets may think, the Pope is a Pole, there is a lot of trouble with the Poles, and the Pope is on the side of the troublemakers. So if the Pope were eliminated, this would help the Soviet

situation in Poland. This is a possibility. But I do not believe the construction works. Above all, the slaying of the Pope would not have benefited the Soviets. The risk would outweigh all possible advantages.

The Armenians clearly oppose current and recent Papal policies. But the Armenians are Christians. Despite differences between the Armenian Church and the Catholic Church, the Armenian majority does not seem to oppose the Pope to the point of murder.

The Armenians, at least some of them, for reasons I understand, are vengeful for the genocide which was practiced by the Turks on the Armenians. But I cannot understand how the historical revenge feeling for the genocide by the Turks would translate into an attack on the Pope.

The involvement of dissident Catholics inclined toward terrorism would be more logical: They are one of the few groups who consistently have been opposing Vatican policies, the ruling Pope, and his predecessors. You could hear them argue about the present Pope being a Polish Communist. I have heard this sort of nonsense myself. But I do not believe Agca, as a person of Eastern Mediterranean background, would be moved by that ideology, or be fanatically interested in the Pope.

The theory that Agca acted for reasons of homosexuality can be ignored. Evidence emerged that he is not homosexual. Theories that he is epileptic, psychopathic, or fanatic explain nothing.

If the cui bono shows anything, it is that the attack on the Pope would be destabilizing. But that effect would happen mainly in Italy, with the result that the Italian clergy might recapture the Papacy. The Polish situation, by contrast, would develop ever more strongly against the U.S.S.R.

The Turkish police believes that Agca was moved by a powerful organization. The indicators may point vaguely to the wire-pullers of the Red Brigades, perhaps as a start of new tactics, or as a rerun on a bigger scale of the Moro operation. But such a hypothesis cannot so far be solidified, and a Kremlin interest cannot be postulated.

I do take the Agca example in order to show that in this universe of terrorism it is not advisable to rely on purely logical estimating procedures. Cui bono? We do not know. The attack on the Pope seems to be a leftist attack, perhaps with an atheist, twist; but it could have been motivated by extremist dissident Catholics.

Agca may existentially represent several strings of motives; he may be for hire, or he may be herostratic. There are many of those "multidimensional" types among the terrorists, and multidimensionality may be a key to understanding.

As to the effects of the attentat, if it had succeeded, the cui bono question would elicit this general answer: Irrationality strengthens the terror effect; and on any level of intensity, destabilization helps the U.S.S.R., and no one else.

Nothing in the record indicates that Agca was a loner.[1]

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[1] Mr. Possony subsequently submitted additional information.

On July 20, 1981, the trial of Agca began in Rome. In addressing the court Agca described himself as an "international terrorist" who had decided to help terrorists of all colors, regardless of whether they stood to the right or to the left. He disapproved, however, of some "neo-Fascist" crimes like the attack during the Munich Oktoberfest and the bombing of the railroad

With that, I close.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Possony, for your testimony. I followed it very carefully and took notes, and we will look forward to the heroic efforts of the court reporter when I look at this lengthy transcript. It will be a valuable edition.

I do not think I have any questions except one regarding what you just said. You mentioned, as you went through the period of about 1978, that the Tri-Continental effort was pretty much dead, and that the Cubans had taken over.

I have read in sources, including a book by Mr. Francis who is sitting next to you as well as one by Claire Sterling, that there was a sort of usurpation of Castro's prerogatives beginning in 1962 and culminating in about 1968 through Soviet pressure—something called economic blackmail.

He was not quite as ambitious from his own mind with respect to what to do in other Latin American countries. That did not satisfy the Soviet Union and although you characterized them as having said, "OK, you go ahead and do what you want" early on, there is a train of evidence which tends to indicate that this development did take place.

I quote Mr. Francis' book,

> Castro could not resist this economic blackmail and by the summer of 1968 had capitulated to Soviet pressure. On August 23, 1968, he publicly defended the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in the following years the Soviets, acting mainly through Raul Castro, superimposed what has been called the satellization of Cuba and the takeover of the DGI,

which was the Cuban intelligence outfit.

> The Cuban army was reduced in size and the DGI was expanded. The Cuban Foreign Ministry was purged in 1970 and '81 and Cuban ambassadors were replaced by more reliable personnel, including DGI officers. In 1969, Pineiro Losada was himself replaced as director of the DGI by the pro-Soviet protege of Raul, Jose Mendes Cominches. The DGI was radically reorganized along the lines of the KGB. Then a KGB general, Victor Simenov, was put in charge of the DGI and had the authority of review of the annual operational plans of the DGI down to the section level. His office is adjacent to that of Mendes Cominches.
>
> Moreover, from 1964, the KGB trained 60 DGI and internal security officers from Cuba at its schools near Moscow. Some of these Cubans are approached directly by the KGB and induced to work for it, but even those who are not aware of the pro-Soviet orientation of some within the DGI—and they are careful in expressing or undertaking anti-Soviet statements or actions.
>
> Castro and the anti-Soviet faction in Cuba did not welcome this process of satellization and sought to resist it.

It says, "It is through the DGI that the Soviet-Cuban axis has supported terrorism in Latin America as well as in other parts of the world."

Those are a little different from saying that Cuba had taken them over themselves, and I point out the distinction for whatever

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station in Bologna. He stated no one had suggested to him that he should attack the Pope. If he had intended to kill him, he would have fired all the 24 rounds he had in his pistol.

The police protocol which was prepared for the court summarized Agca's admissions or assertions as follows: he secured funds by blackmail; he obtained several passports, including one from Switzerland; he acquired the pistol in Bulgaria; he never was in Libya but took a terrorist training course in Beirut which lasted for 35 to 40 days; in Beirut he was taught the handling of weapons and the forging of documents.

Agca also stated that he was urged to kill the following persons: Prime Minister Mintoff of Malta, President Bourgiba of Tunisia; the Queen of England; and Mrs. Simone Veil, President of the European Parliament.

If those assertions are true and they were properly recorded by the Italian police, the PLO clearly was involved in the attentat against Pope John Paul II. Note the alleged disinterest in political colorations.

comment first Mr. Francis might have, and then you might have in possible rebuttal.

Mr. FRANCIS. I have nothing to add and would stand by what I said. I believe Dr. Possony was suggesting the possibility that early Cuban terrorism, prior to 1968, with Che Guevara, et cetera, had clandestine acquiescence of the Soviet Union.

Senator DENTON. Yes, I understand that. I take no exception to any thing you said. I am only questioning that the Cubans by their own volition—he did not mention the Soviet influence or apparent usurpation of Castro's own initiative.

Are you familiar with that train of evidence or that particular allegation?

Dr. POSSONY. Senator, I am not quite sure I follow the argument. As far as I can see, first of all, the Tri-Continental operation was an attempt to achieve an organism which can be used for guerrilla and terrorist warfare, articulated on three continents, and being coordinated.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir; I am familiar with it.

Dr. POSSONY. So, that is quite clear. Then it is also quite clear that the Tri-Continental concept was theoretical, even utopian. It just was not in the cards to get this done.

Senator DENTON. Yes.

Dr. POSSONY. By the late 1970's, the Asian and the African elements provided only platonic support to the Latin Americans. As a result, the Cubans automatically became the main force. They took over and ran things.

The Cubans were running things in Cuba, and perhaps in one or the other theaters. I regard this as compatible with the fact that KGB personnel is sitting in the Cuban operational headquarters, notably the GDI.

The Soviets are unable to control, let alone command, all terrorist activities. They could not, even if they wanted to, and they do not want to, in the first place, because that would be a wrong way of managing this particular type of operation. The Soviets are on top, but they require the good will, the initiative, and the local expertise of the Cubans. For obvious reasons, the Cubans do not need to be so submissive as the East Germans. The wise thing for the Soviets to do in this operation is to delegate authority.

If you were to mount a guerrilla or terrorist operation, cutouts would be the first persons you are looking for. The last thing you would do is to show up in a place or area where you can be seen. You must find local talent to carry out the operation in all phases. Exposure is absolutely forbidden. Pulling rank should also be taboo, although the Soviets may not resist the temptation.

Spontaneity is part of the operation, and it is useful. If the terrorists themselves are not spontaneous, they will not operate effectively. The Vietcong and the Red Brigades have been exceptionally spontaneous—that is their secret.

The contribution of the U.S.S.R. has been primarily the creation of a vast infrastructure through which the terrorists can be trained, move from place to place, and engage in "combat," perhaps in spontaneous combat. Incidentally, the need for, and the utilization of, spontaneity would have given ulcers to Stalin. So everything flows, even the Communist doctrine.

The infrastructure originally was supposed to be fashioned by the Tri-Continental Organization. That did not work out, and a substitute solution had to be found, leaving ample room for spontaneity. Parts of that structure are still concealed.

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir. No one on this committee believes that there is a detailed central direction. We did not believe that when we began the hearings. We did not think that would be one of the findings. We heard nothing to shake that belief.

But we do believe that what is significant is the degree of cui bono and the evidences that are available—circumstantially and otherwise—of direct and indirect Soviet support for the purpose of pragmatic gain.

So, I believe we are making progress and your testimony today has been an important part of that.

In view of the importance of Mr. Francis' own book, "The Soviet Strategy of Terror," we would request that Mr. Francis look favorably upon an invitation in the future to testify.

Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DENTON. I would like to thank both of you gentlemen very much, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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